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PUBLIC SERVICE

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE. 1826/1.

1952

Mr. Wakefield
Amman to
Middle East Secretariat

S.182/1/113/51.

29th December 51

4th January 52.

Resettlement of refugees in villages in Jordan.

Nothing has been accomplished re the question of dispersion of refugees from the large camps. Gives details of proposals being worked out by Jordan UNRWA for lease of private land.

Last Paper

EE1821/128 (1951)

References

EE1821/117
/127 } 1951.

98511

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Camps) Myers Beirut 10 Jan

(Minutes)

A Lelp but letter. Cyg sent to Mr Evans in Paris.
Cyg to Mr Myers, Beirut.

Cw 9/1
BE 16/1

Now see EE1827/4. Cw 22/3

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

37330

S182/1/113/51

CONFIDENTIAL

E

British Legation,
Amman.

29th December 1951.

EE 1821/117(1951)

EE 1826/1

Dear Middle East Secretariat,

We refer to your letter dated 7th November 1951, regarding the resettlement of refugees in small numbers in and near villages. We have waited to see whether UNRWA policy would develop so that some of your questions could be answered, but progress is too slow to merit further delay.

2. On the general question of dispersion of refugees from the large camps throughout the country, nothing has been accomplished. The idea was until recently alive in the local offices of UNRWA, but foundered upon two rocks. Firstly by agreement the Government has to provide the sites. Since there is no money provided within the Government Budget for payment of rent for sites, refugees have to be put on State Domain wherever it can be found. Secondly the administrative difficulties of dispersion discouraged efforts directed towards dispersion. UNRWA in Jordan have only two settlement officers in the field to undertake this work, and the Ministry concerned with camps and resettlement has no field officers. Without doubt these rocks could have been circumvented with determination, but it was found to be a comfortable policy to leave the refugees in the camps.

EE 1821/127 (1950)

3. With regard to settling artisans, there are plans to build housing schemes similar to the Amman housing scheme in various towns - see our letter S182/1/107/51 dated 17th December 1951 paragraph 4 C.20-27. These rather expensive schemes take care of some of the refugees round the towns, but the villages are not touched. Partly again this is a problem of personnel, partly village opposition, and partly inertia.

4. The issue of purchase or lease of land offered to the Agency by private landowners is still not solved. No policy decision can be taken, it seems, until Mr. Blandford returns from Paris and his other journeyings. Meanwhile the Jordan office of UNRWA is working out proposals for lease of private land on the lines described in our letter referred to above. Below are some fuller details of the division of the spoils between the refugee and the landowner as proposed by the Agency. It is hoped that Mr. Blandford will endorse this approach so that these proposals can be generally used in negotiation with landowners.

" Planning costs (full use of UNRWA technical staff and facilities)
Constructional Costs (materials only)
Cash Price for Build ing Plots
Increased Land Values

The above or their ultimate value will accrue to the landowner.

...../Canals

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Canals
Reservoirs
Wells
Pump Houses etc.

The above come under the general heading of permanent fixtures. It is intended that these shall accrue to the landowner in certain conditions, chief of which will be a long term lease for the refugee tenants.

Animals
Seeds
Tools
Equipment
Houses and sites.

The above will accrue to the refugee settlers, either by direct grant from the Agency or, in some cases, such as the houses on the building site, by loan against repayment.

Internal Roads,
Clinics
Schools and other Communal Facilities

The above would, in all probability, only be included after some lapse of time. The question of ownership would form the subject of a separate contract when the time came for their construction.

The foregoing omits only one item of importance, namely, the provision of pumps, engines, and other expensive installations essential to the scheme. Now that the Jordan Development Bank Ltd. has been instituted, the Agency is no longer in a position to furnish these to the landowner through interest free loans. At the same time, it is not possible for the Agency to make grants of expensive machinery etc. to individuals. If a scheme of this type had the Agency's approval, it would recommend the landowner to the Jordan Development Bank Ltd. for an appropriate loan under the Bank's usual conditions with which you are already familiar.

Terms of Lease. Since the Agency's purpose in this scheme is the settlement of refugees on the land, the Agency would wish to see all leases drawn up between the landowner and the refugee tenant. It would be immaterial to the Agency whether the lease was on a cash rental or a share-cropping basis, but the minimum period of lease would have to be ten years.

Relief for refugee tenants would be guaranteed up to the first harvest or maximum of one year, whichever is the sooner.

5. In the last two weeks there has been a degree of refugee disperison in distressing circumstances caused by a week of tempest in Jordan. Tents were torn to pieces by the winds and rain and mud huts disintegrated. The camp dwellers had to be found some kind of shelter in public buildings in towns and villages, and in the new housing estates of Ghor Nimreen and Amman. We will take the opportunity of this misfortune to impress upon the Agency and Government the need to try to scatter the refugees more evenly throughout the country.

...../6.

6. The collapse of about half the mud huts which UNRWA has been persuading the refugees to build against the conditions of winter is a minor disaster. That this small effort of self help has come to so early an end is in our view largely owing to lack of technical guidance. Whatever the reason the refugees will be as a result less inclined than ever to do anything for themselves. It is nevertheless an opportunity for dispersion since clearly it would be a waste to rebuild the large camps. We will do what we can to persuade the Agency to take this opportunity.

Yours ever,

Amman Chancery.

P. G. A. Wake Field.

X 120

1952.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE. 1826/2.

BBC monitoring
6.
9th January 52.
R. 11th Jan.

Arab refugees in Lebanon demand repatriation to Palestine.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

16/1

References

MEN to 16/1
Mr Rhodes
P. to R.
18/1

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
22/1	28/4

Next Paper

37330

6: = LEBANON: PALESTINE REFUGEES DEMAND REPATRIATION =

(ARAB NEWS AGENCY, CAIRO, 05.44) BEIRUT: THE ARAB HIGH COMMITTEE IN BEIRUT HAS CABLED UN THAT THE PALESTINE REFUGEES IN LEBANON UNANIMOUSLY INSIST ON THEIR RIGHT TO REPATRIATION TO PALESTINE, RESTITUTION OF THEIR PROPERTY AND FUNDS, AND REPARATIONS FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THEM. THEY REPEAT THEIR REJECTION OF ANY SETTLEMENT OR PROJECT AIMED AT THEIR SETTLEMENT IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AND REQUEST THAT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS ITS PRESENT SESSION, SHOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY SPEEDY MEASURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS NUMEROUS RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES.

EE 1826/2

END BBC MONITORING 10.03 9/1 LF. KY.

(SECOND LINE OF TEXT PLS READ.. BEIRUT HAS CABLED UN...

++

Lebanon

Mr. P. A. Rhodes
Room 72
Eastern Depot
FO



1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/3

FROM Sir. J. Rapp. BMEO Cairo to Mr. Evans.

No. 228/53/1

Dated 22nd Jan.

Received in Registry— 28th Jan.

Resettlement of Refugees.

A copy of a letter to Walker at Amman reporting that UNRWA is making grants for capital expenditure, and either loans or grants for initial operating costs in connection with a number of resettlement schemes.

References

MINUTES

Sir H. Knight shd. see.

CWatkins 29/1

JH 30.1.52.

CW 30/1

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) JW 31/1

(Index) 28/4

41070

B.M.E.O.
10 Sharia Tolumbat,
Cairo.

228/53/1

RESTRICTED.

22nd January, 1952.

I understand from Cheesman, our Co-operative Adviser, that the U.N.R.W.A. is making grants for capital expenditure, and either loans or grants for initial operating costs, in connection with a number of small resettlement schemes; and that, since the Agency is not permitted to make grants to private individuals, but only to public bodies, co-operative societies have been organised to receive the grants, the capital expenditure being made under Agency supervision and the benefits passed on to the refugees conditionally.

2. Cheesman has been assisting the Agency staff in organising these co-operative undertakings and recently he has been concerned in particular about the conditions laid down for the Beit Qad scheme. The co-operative society in this case obtained a grant of JD. 2,600 for the settlement of the 13 families in order to provide the necessary animals, equipment, seeds and fertilisers. The refugee families were enthusiastic but before the grant was paid over, I understand that Pruen, General Galloway's deputy in charge of re-integration, had to insist that each member sign an agreement renouncing all right to rations from September 1952. It appears that there was difficulty in inducing the refugees to sign this undertaking and they have naturally lost heart and keenness.

3. While I realise the importance of reducing the ration roll as quickly as possible, I cannot help feeling that there is insufficient recognition of the regard in which a refugee holds his ration card. In a wrecked world it is the one stable factor which he values out of all proportion to the monetary value of the rations. I wonder therefore if the position could not be re-examined.

4. I am copying this letter to Sir Henry Knight, whose comments I would appreciate. You may have an opportunity of discussing the problem with General Galloway and with Pruen and I should be glad to hear their and your views.

5. I am also copying this letter to Trefor Evans.

T.C.RAPP.

M.T.Walker Esq.,
British Legation,
Amman.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

1952

EE 1826/4.

Mr. Mitchell Steel
Bristol

D. 6th January

R 8th January.
? Feb.

Housing of Arab refugees in the Lebanon:-

Offers and quotes price of bungalows. States he can supply other kinds of buildings, and will be pleased to quote for tents, stocks of army clothing, and possibly salted or frozen fish.

Last Paper

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)
Ack. 9/2.

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

(Minutes)

This letter only reached the Department 2 or 3 days ago.

~~Copy to Mr O Meyers, Beirut, for info, with reply. & to Mr W. Nicol, B of Trade.~~

~~CW 11/2~~

Messrs Harrison & Crossfield (Mr Chambers) UNRWA's agents in London, will contact this firm.

CW 11/2

37021

E.E. 1826/4

Enter E

Bristol 6 . 1 . 52.

E

Dear Sir

I have read in the press you intend housing about 200.000 Arab Refugees about Lebanon, I wish to inform you we have on offer cheap bungalows of 5 rooms built of Timber, covered with Asbestos & lined with insulating board 44 ft long, 12 ft wide price £750 C.I.F. your ports, may be you have in mind other class of buildings if so we shall be pleased to quote you, we also have Tents, & huge stocks of cheap Army Surplus clothing for men & some for women also boots & may be can supply Fish Salted, or Frozen. On having your reply that you are interested we will go further into the business. Thanking you & remain.

Yours Sincerely

Mitchell Steel
107, Thingwall Rack,
Fishponds
Bristol.

M. Steel

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/5.

PRESS EXTRACT.

(Scotsman)

11.2.52.

14.2.52.

"Resettle Palestine Arabs Refugees"

New York Republican to call.

Last Paper

(*Minutes*)

CW15/2

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
16/2	1028/4

Next Paper

37021

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

E E1826/5

1) Mr Evans
2) EE

SCOTSMAN.

Cutting dated 11 FEB 1952 194

"RESETTLE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEES"

New York Republican's Call

WASHINGTON, Sunday.—Mr Jacob Javits (Republican, New York) to-day urged that a "realistic effort" be made to resettle between 600,000 and 870,000 Palestine Arab refugees by the outright purchase of under-populated land in surrounding Arab countries.

Mr Javits made this recommendation in a report to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee after a special mission to Israel.

Mr Javits, a member of the House Committee, suggested that part of the 250 million dollar (£89,289,000) United Nations fund for Arab refugees be used to buy the land.

He said Israel's recognition of the urgency of the Arab refugee problem was an assurance that she would do a "good deal" to help solve it.

Abandoned Arab lands and frozen bank deposits valued at about 300 million dollars (£107,140,000) were now administered by a custodian of abandoned property appointed by the Israel Government.

Israel was prepared to negotiate on these Arab assets in connection with any overall project for resettlement of the refugees, Mr Javits said.—Reuter.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/6

Mr Walker.

AMMAN.

To Mr Evans.

11201/10.

18 . 2 . 52.

23 . 2 . 52.

Ration cards of resettled refugees.

He has discussed the effect of the withdrawal of ration cards from resettled refugees.

Addressed to Sir T. Rapp, BMEO, Fayid.
Copied to Sir H. Knight, Beirut

Last Paper

(Minutes)

C. Waterlow
27/2

References

EE1826/3

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

28/2

(Index)

28/4

Next Paper

37330

11201/10
CONFIDENTIAL

British Legation,
Amman.

18th February 1952

N/R.

The point which you raised in your letter to me No. 228/53/1 of 22nd January affecting the ration cards of resettled refugees has been discussed with Sir Alexander Galloway and with Pruen.

2. They feel that the increasing pressure to cut down the relief bill, clear evidence of which is to be seen in the decreasing appropriations for relief over the next three years, will oblige them to explain to the refugee that his rations will be cut upon resettlement. In fact there is not likely to be any hardship caused to the refugee from precipitate cutting of rations for both the Government and the UNRWA have to agree that the refugee is able to look after himself before the card is withdrawn.

3. However the psychological dismay which the withdrawal of a ration card causes to refugees has been fully realised, and a plan was submitted some three months ago to Beirut which might go some way to alleviate this sense of insecurity caused by the withdrawal of the ration card. The intention was to exchange the ration card for another card which showed that the possessor was a refugee and therefore entitled to compensation and so on. The form of the card was disputed. Headquarters wished to avoid any political undertakings on the card and to confine the wording to some simple formula as, for example, "Ahmed Ahmed was the holder of an UNRWA ration card". In my opinion such an exchange might help to overcome the disinclination to surrender a ration card, and perhaps Sir Henry Knight might be able to hurry along a decision in Beirut on this subject.

4. I am copying this letter to Sir Henry Knight and Trefor Evans.

FCO-IWPGA Wakefield

(M.T.Walker)

Sir Thomas Rapp, K.B.E., C.M.G., M.C.,
British Middle East Office,
Fayid.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1823/1826/7

Chancery, BMEO Cairo
D M.E.S.

225/53/1

21.2.52.
28.2.52.

Resettlement – Jordan

Encloses copy of a note by Mr Mooney, forestry adviser, on tree planting and farm forestry in connection with refugee resettlement in Jordan.
(add. D Ch. Amman 21/2/52)

Last Paper

(Minutes)

It looks as if the planting season may be missed. Chr 3/3

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
C 4/3.	3614

Next Paper

37021

225/53/1

B.M.E.O. Cairo.

British Middle East Office,

Cairo.

21st February, 1952.

Dear Chancery,

We enclose herewith a copy of a note by Dr. Mooney, forestry adviser, on tree planting and farm forestry in connexion with refugee resettlement in Jordan, already copied to various departments of UNRWA direct.

2. You will see that the expenditure visualised in the suggestions is modest in amount and, if the work is to be done this year, must be authorised without delay. Can you tell us what action UNRWA have decided to take?

3. We are copying this letter with enclosure to Beirut for the United Kingdom Advisory Commission to UNRWA and to Middle East Secretariat.

Yours ever,

Chancery.

Chancery,
British Legation,
Amman.

February 12 1952.

To : Director

From : Dr. H.F. Mooney
British Middle East Office

Subject : Forestry Plantation - Jordan
Reintegration Projects

I saw MacLean at Amman and discussed with him the possibilities of tree-planting and Farm Forestry in connection with the settlement schemes for refugees which have been started or which are contemplated in Jordan. It appears that two areas are involved: the Jordan Valley and around Kerak.

The Jordan Valley

2. I visited Marj Naja colony which is situated some miles north of Jericho on the west bank of the Jordan. The settlement consists of 700 dunums of State Domain land on which 30 families are to be settled. Some provision has already been made for tree planting in the settlement area but so far nothing has actually been done. The work should be taken up without any further delay and completed by the end of February. If this is not done it will be too late to do anything this year. There will be three types of work:

(a) Village Fuel Areas. There is a rocky hill behind the village which should be afforested to provide a supply of fuel and brushwood. The most suitable species will be Wattle (Acacia cyanophylla), Robinia (Robinia pseudacacia) and Mesquite (Prosopis juliflora). The last named will also yield pods which are a valuable fodder for goats. It should be possible to find 50 - 100 acres for afforestation in this locality.

At the southern end of the settlement there is a wide expanse of ground covered with Atriplex, indicating a considerable degree of salinity. This land can not be used for agriculture but it is just possible that it could be afforested if Tamarix orientalis (T. articulata) or Eucalyptus gomphocephala were used. They should be tried on an experimental scale at first; and if they succeed a second plantation for the production of fuel and small timber could be made here. Such a plantation would also serve as a shelter-belt.

(b) Avenues in the Settlement. Avenues and small groups of trees should be planted in the main part of the settlement for shade and adornment. Suitable species for the purpose are: Shisham (Dalbergia sissoo), Robinia, Mulberry, Casuarina (a few), Eucalyptus tereticornis and E. gomphocephala (a few - but not near crops), Acacia arabica, Dalbergia lanceolaria and Peltophorum ferrugineum. All these trees except the last combine utility with a good appearance; and the Peltophorum is a very fast-growing ornamental tree suitable for avenues and gardens.

(c) Windbreaks should be planted along the plot boundaries of the agricultural land. Double rows of cypress (Cupressus sempervirens, var. horizontalis) undoubtedly make the best windbreaks; but owing to the danger of salinity in the subsoil it is probable that it would be safer to use Tamarix orientalis, which also makes an excellent windbreak if planted in single lines with two metres between individual plants.

3. Some poplars should be planted where ample water is available. Rooted cuttings of Populus robusta var. angulata can be obtained from Tyre through the Department of Agriculture, Lebanon. This is a very fast-growing species; but P. alba amd P. nigra could also be used. They can, however, only be grown on the banks of a stream or canal.

/ 4. Besides

4. Besides Marj Naja, there are two other settlements - Karrameh and Beit Qad - on the east bank of the Jordan which can be dealt with in the same way as Marj Naja.

5. Costs. Plants for this work will come from the forest nursery at Nablus. If J.D. 200 were paid to the Jordan Government to cover the capital cost of expanding the Nablus nursery, I understand that they would be willing to supply all seeds and seedlings necessary for the work. They would also lend a man to supervise the work of afforestation and the planting of avenues and windbreaks. Besides this J.D. 400 would be required for the labour employed in planting at Marj Naja; and a similar amount for Karrameh and Beit Qad.

The Kerak Area.

6. I understand that there may be some settlements on private land in the vicinity of Kerak. I have not seen the sites which have been chosen but much of the land around Kerak is well suited to afforestation work. Since the settlement work has not yet been undertaken it is unlikely that any sowing or planting will be possible this year; but I suggest that the small nursery at Kerak be expanded so that an adequate supply of plants may be ready for next year. For this purpose the Jordan Government would require J.D.200 at once.

7. I should like to lay emphasis on the need for prompt action being taken to implement these proposals. Unless the work of sowing and planting in the Jordan Valley settlements can be completed before the end of February it will be too late to do anything this season and a whole year will be lost. Similarly, if the Kerak nursery is to be in a position to supply all the plants that will be required next year, it must be extended and the seed must be sown before March. The amounts required are small, so I trust there will be no difficulty or delay in allocating funds.

8. If it is decided to act on my suggestions, the Chief of the Jordan Forest Service would like UNRWA to provide as many empty biscuit tins as possible for raising plants in his nurseries.

9. I propose to return to inspect the Kerak projects and to discuss possibilities in Syria; but I do not think it advisable to go ahead with the establishment of new nurseries in the latter country until something more definite is known about the settlement schemes.

/H.F. Mooney/

British Middle East Office

Copy to UNRWA Representative - Jordan
Attention: Mr. Pruen

Copy to Director of Department of Lands & Surveys - Jordan
Through UNRWA Representative - Jordan

Copies (2) to Projects Office.

1952

E

PALESTINE

EE 1826/8

Sir H. Knight.
Beirut.
To Mr Evans.

AC. 100/7.
26. 2. 52.
3. 3. 52.

Resettlement of refugees.

Details of a plan put forward for U.N.R.W.A. to spend $11 million on reintegration in Jordan.

(Copied) Amman, B.M.E.O. & W. Ran.

Last Paper

References

ET 1421/2.
EE 1826/10

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Col. Russell Edmonds, Tsy. for ~~Mr Evans~~. Miss Waterlaw. 1 Mch.

Sir H. Knight c/o Beirut for Miss Evans. 12 Mch.

Mr Houghton, U.S. Embassy, for Miss Waterlaw 10 April

(Action completed) 13/3

(Index) 28/10

Next Paper

(Minutes.)

This is not a bad effort. The emphasis on 'housing' is right — $2.5m. out of $6.5m. being on this purpose in the short term programme & $1.5m. out of $4.5m. in the long term programme.

We should press Col. Russell Edmonds for a reply.

6/3

Mr Waterlaw

Now see —/10.

Letter to Sir H. Knight (copies to Amman Washington B.M.E.O. (Cairo) & Treasury (Col Russell Edmonds))

12/3

34967

Enter soon.

I hope you will agree with the line I have taken in the attached letter.

E Wakefield
1/3

Mr Hunter

The more UNRWA can spend on this kind of thing, the less pressure there will be on us to pay for it — insofar as the refugee & "Jordan proper" spheres overlap, which of course they do although the Jordan Govt. don't admit it.

J Hunter
3-III

Nothing to be Writ

(AC 100/7)

CONFIDENTIAL

E 1826/8

United Kingdom Delegation,
Advisory Commission U.N.R.W.A.

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

26th February, 1952.

My dear Evans,

Locke has asked UNRWA for a plan for UNRWA to spend or commit $11 million on reintegration in Jordan before 30th June, 1952, so that he can approach Congress with a definite and appealing programme which will justify the immediate transfer of $10 million U.S.A. funds to UNRWA reintegration ($2 million have already been transferred).

2. Blandford has put up a plan, or rather perhaps suggestions, to use $10 million thus in Jordan, but the Advisory Commission has not yet had time to examine it.

3. Briefly it falls into two parts:

(I) relatively short-term reintegration schemes from which results in settling refugees can be expected within 12 months of starting work;

(II) long-term schemes "deriving directly or indirectly from the (Jordan) Government five-year plan, which will provide reintegration opportunities only after a period in excess of one year, but which will create considerable employment during this early stage".

4. I attach a summary of the two parts.

5. Part II looks like abandoning the objective of the 1950 General Assembly Resolution that UNRWA should use its funds for relief and for reintegration and not for work relief projects. At first glance Part II looks like UNRWA spending $4.5 million on work relief with no refugee settled at the end to show for it. But without further details it is difficult to be certain. If the intention is for the British loan, or the World Bank, or Mutual Aid funds, etc., to pay for the main development and UNRWA for only e.g. housing, olive grove planting, minor roads and other facilities for the human side of economic development, I see no objection. Direct reintegration having made so little progress we might as well try indirect reintegration.

6. As regards item 4 of Part II, this may or may not tie in with the general Jordan valley survey and development referred to in your letter (ET 1421/2) of the 19th February to Greenhill, but obviously the plan would have to be adjusted to any change in circumstances.

7. The scheme is of course merely something put up to help get the money out of Congress, and subject to your not objecting to some indirect reintegration I propose to agree to it. But I reserve my opinion as to the ultimate practicability of putting it into effect.

8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Amman, to BM.E.O. (Development Division) and to Greenhill at Washington.

Yours sincerely,

H. Knight.

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Enclosure to Sir Henry Knight's letter (AC 100/7) of 26th February, 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 c/se

PART I - SHORT TERM SCHEMES

		Estimated Total Cost	Families Reintegrated
1.	Small irrigation projects on State land (Zors scheme, Wadi Fera'a, Merj Na'aja, Wadi Ben Hamad, etc.)	550,000	350
2.	Loan projects on private land through Development Bank (Bisharat Farm, Kerak Scheme, etc.	1,400,000	1,500
3.	Equipment and Animals for above	300,000	-
4.	Rural Housing at £700 per family (including houses for all above schemes)	2,000,000	1,000
5.	Industrial projects (Participations in various small industrial schemes through Development Bank, e.g. textiles, paper mill, building materials, tanning, Dead Sea chemicals, oil pressing, fish canning, etc.)	1,000,000	300
6.	Urban housing at £1,400 per family	500,000	-
7.	Crafts and Small Service Enterprises	50,000	100
8.	Training - Agricultural, Mechanical, Medical (for reintegration in Jordan and other countries).	400,000	2,000
9.	Surveys (Economic, Hydrological, Geophysical, Soil Surveys, etc., including exploratory well-boring, etc.)	300,000	-
	£	6,500,000	5,250

PART II - LONG TERM SCHEMES

		Cost £	Years to Complete	Labour Force Required
1.	Agricultural (Olive tree plantation, Shera'a resettlement, farm forestry, long-term schemes on private land)	1,500,000	2-5	2,000
2.	Industry (Maintenance, servicing and complementary industries and work-shops relating £10 million Industrial and Mineral Development Schemes proposed in Government Plan)	500,000	2-3	300
3.	Communications (Housing, Services, and Community Facilities for Akaba Port, Village development along Amman - Akaba Road and other planned additions to road and railway communications	1,000,000	2-5	1,000
4.	Housing and Community Services for Yarmuk Scheme	1,500,000	2-5	1,000
	£	4,500,000		4,300

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

1st March, 1952.

EE1826/8.

Dft

OUTFILE

I enclose herewith a copy of the letter from Sir Henry Knight which I spoke to you about on the telephone this morning, in which he asks whether we can agree that UNRWA should allocate some £4½ million to development schemes in Jordan which will provide indirectly rather than directly for the resettlement of the refugees.

2. You will appreciate that the background to this request is that Jordan is the only country in which the Agency is at present in a position to make an immediate start with schemes of any sort. The result of their surveys in the Sinai Peninsular is, as far as I am aware, not yet known; and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have not so far agreed to resettlement projects in their territories. The possibilities for direct resettlement schemes in Jordan are, however, at present, very limited. The only areas where resettlement on any reasonable scale can take place are the Shera'a, where the Agency have been carrying out surveys (whose results also are not yet known), and the Jordan Valley, where progress depends upon the

/carrying

Colonel Russell Edmunds, T.D.,
The Treasury.

carrying out of irrigation schemes. If the Agency must therefore prepare a plan of action in order to secure from Congress the funds offered by the United States Government, the alternatives would seem to be either a plan on the lines of that set out in the enclosure to Sir Henry Knight's letter, or investment by the Agency in larger capital schemes such as irrigation works. The latter alternative would be contrary to the policy which has so far been accepted by the Agency and ourselves and might lead the Agency into commitments which it might subsequently prove unable fully to implement. We are, therefore, inclined to authorise Sir H. Knight to accept this programme; but before doing so we should be grateful for your comments.

(C. M. Waterlow)

(RE 1826/8)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTFILE

12th March, 1952.

Your letter AC 100/7 of the 26th February regarding the Agency's plans for Jordan up to the 30th June.

2. We certainly see no objection to a measure of indirect resettlement - in fact, as far as I can see, this is inevitable. But, as you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter from the Treasury, the provisional plan involves a good number of difficulties.

3. I assume, however, that before any decision is taken for implementing particularly part 2 of the programme, the Advisory Commission will have an opportunity of examining the individual projects in detail and that you will be able to consult us. If this is so, the points made by the Treasury will be covered.

4. I was glad to see the emphasis given in the programme to housing projects.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chancery at Amman, the Development Division at M.E.E.C. and to Denis Greenhill.

(T. E. Evans)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., C.I.E.,
British Legation, Beirut.

see below. TOC 16

Registry
No. EE 1826/8.

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

to
Mr. Robert B. Houghton
Esq.
US Embassy.

from
CWatterlow.

Pp flagged within.

OUTFILE

As promised, I enclose herewith a copy of the programme for short & long term refugee resettlement schemes in Jordan which Mr Blandford recently submitted to the Jordan Government. The latter have, we now understand, accepted this programme in principle.

CW 9/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
9 APR 1952
SENT TO TYPE 17/4
DIRECTIONS

(12733) 7/51 D.L.

No. EE 1826/5 OUTFILE FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10th April, 1952.

As promised, I enclose herewith a copy of the programme for short and long term refugee resettlement schemes in Jordan which Mr. Blandford recently submitted to the Jordan Government. The latter have, we now understand, accepted this programme in principle.

(Miss C. Waterlow)

Mr. Robert B. Houghton,
United States Embassy,
1, Grosvenor Square,
W.1.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

E 1826/9

Legation, Amman. To Mr Evans.

11201/13.

28. 2. 52.

8. 3. 52.

Refugee's ration cards.

Discusses the psychological effect of a ration card made of cardboard with perhaps a photo attached.

(Sir H. Knight To Mr Keen. of 20 Feb.)

Last Paper

(Minutes)

EW 11/3

Reference

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

37613

COPY

Beirut 20.2.52.

My dear Keen,

Thank you for showing me the papers about the sanction to give refugees who come off the ration a card stating that Mr. X was a refugee on UNRWA's list. And I presume that Galloway is now issuing such.

On thinking it over I am inclined to advise further consideration whether a photograph of the refugee concerned would not be appropriately affixed to the card.

Psychologically a card or stout paper with UN arms and a photo affixed would probably have a greater effect in reconciling the refugee to his coming off the ration than a mere scrap of paper, as being obviously an official recognition of his refugee status and on our successfully getting the cooperation of the refugees the future depends.

I do not think that the difficulty of taking the necessary photo would be insuperable. In fact one might reintegrate a refugee photographer for it. And the photo might discourage the forgery of such cards, which might some day be as valuable as the Lebanese £L 100 notes now creating so much stir. Probably the Arab attaches as much importance to "documents" and "certificates" as the Indian does. I think that it is worth thinking over.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H.F. Knight

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

E E1826/10

Col Russell –
Edmunds.

Treasury
& Miss Waterlow.

FF 48/018.

11 Mar.
13 Mar.

Resettlement of Refugees.

Discusses the £11 m. plan for re-integration in Jordan & points out the difficulties.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Sec 18.

CW 14/3

Reference

– 18.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

13/3

(Index)

Jodd

Next Paper

37613

MBJ

Tel. No.: WHItehall 1234.

Your Reference .....

Treasury Reference IF 48/018

TREASURY CHAMBERS,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON, S.W.1.

11th March, 1952

Dear Miss Waterlow,

1. Your letter of the 1st March (no reference quoted) about a plan for U.N.R.W.A. to spend or commit $11m. on re-integration in Jordan before 30th June, 1952 has called for very careful consideration inasmuch as some aspects of the proposition tend to be disturbing.

2. It might be argued - indeed Knight poses it as such - that Part II of the proposal is a departure from the objective of the 1950 General Assembly resolution, and is in any case a much wider conception of re-integration than has hitherto prevailed. In launching out on a policy of much wider scope, where may we be going? A complementary arrangement whereby U.N.R.W.A. would provide for the human side of development must carry the corollary that the funds for the main development are known and physically available. Is this so? I would agree that there is H.M.G.'s £1.5m. loan and the $4.2m. U.S. Economic Assistance, but do the total funds thus available justify an U.N.R.W.A. expenditure of $4.5m. as is proposed in Part II of the scheme?

3. On the other hand, the scheme put forward is said to be merely something put up to help in getting the money out of Congress. To an extent this would remove uncertainty, through physical

/possession

Miss C. M. Waterlow,
Foreign Office,

RECEIVED IN C.B.
13 MAR 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
14/3.

possession of funds, in getting ahead with suitable projects, and would achieve the purpose for which H.M.G. increased her contribution up to June, 1952 (the increase of $30m. to $50m. by the U.S. Government), there is much to be said for it subject to one proviso. Knight's reservation as to the ultimate practicability of putting Part II of the scheme into effect should be extended to include such consideration by the Foreign Office and the Treasury. In critically examining Part II, we would wish to satisfy ourselves that the funds for the main development are available to fully warrant the complementary services which U.N.R.W.A. would undertake under Part II, especially items 3 and 4. Moreover, we should also wish to be satisfied that in embarking on such a programme there would be no question of the Agency entering into commitments which it might subsequently prove unable fully to implement.

4. If you are satisfied that H.M.G. would be able to fully examine Part II of the scheme and that, as a result, there would be no question of implementing it where the pre-requisite as to funds for main development is not present in right measure, and also that the point in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph is fully covered, then we would be prepared to agree to the proposal contained in Knight's letter of the 26th February.

Yours sincerely,

W. Russell Edmunds.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/11

Sir H. Knight
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

11-3-52
18-3-52

Resettlement in Syria.

Transmits memorandum of 28th February on certain suggestions to combat some psychological difficulties of resettlement in Syria.

Last Paper

Reference

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dfd Sir H. Knight, Beirut for Miss Waterlow 18 April

(Minutes)

This is evidently a paper submitted by Sir H. Knight to the Advisory Commission. His suggestions seem very sound.

1. P.D. } for comments on para. 28(3)
1. S.D. }

C Waterlow
24/3

30/3

Films are already being shown in the Jordan camps by our Amman mobile unit. This is shortly, we hope, to be joined by another unit (from Persia).

In Syria the attitude of the authorities has made film work impossible. They look like closing down the British Council & are frowning on both our & the U.S. Information Offices in Damascus.

We will do all we can to help as & when it becomes possible.

C T M. Barclay 5/4.

Yes. Ic Gardiner 8/4

CWC 8/4

(Action completed) 21/4

(Index) 28/4

Next Paper

37613

AA.E.173
(2)
F.O

CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS TO COMBAT SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES OF RESETTLEMENT IN SYRIA

1. It seems that considerable converse with the refugees is needed to assess truly all these difficulties, and hence the suggestions put forward at various times for a Near Eastern sociologist.

2. From what has been said in reports and from such talks as I have had with refugees the difficulties appear to belong to three main groups, the psychological, the economic, and the political.

3. Of the first group the most important is fear of the unknown. This is a normal human reaction to any move for a long period; fear of a new place, new neighbours, and possibly a new way of working if the land proves to be different. Fear of leaving the relative security of the camp with its familiar environment and neighbours to start "the battle of life" anew. To this may be added the feeling among many refugees that in Gaza, Jordan, South Syria and South Lebanon they are still near their homes, whereas the Gezirah is of a different World and so immeasurably far away.

4. It may also be found that, among the townspeople and the fellahin, the fear of open spaces may play a part, particularly in the Gezirah and the regions of Selemiyah, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. These vast treeless plains with generally no town or village in sight can hardly be described as having a hospitable aspect, while the greater part of Palestine is a friendly country with villages, villages, streams and hills, and a city just around the corner. It may also be that in the subconscious even the hated (and they were not always so) Jewish neighbours may be reassuring compared with those empty wastes. (Tell Aviv was vastly admired by the unsophisticated Arab).

Though this fear may not exist in the mind of a nomad or semi-nomad to the same degree, it must be remembered that many of the refugee tribesmen have done little wandering.

5. To have an economic fear of being given a home and a farm may seem a paradox, but, though the refugee is not well off, he has now a certain security of food, medical attention, shelter of a sort, and some education. He does not believe these will stop - it is the duty of the West to provide them, his right to have them, and so they will continue for ever. These securities are now all firmly attached in his mind to his ration card and the surrender of this seems equivalent to giving up his and his family's future safety.

6. His political fears are perhaps the least 'real' of them all and yet the strongest. It has been firmly instilled into the refugee's mind that any permanent work, any permanent or for that matter temporary building, means 'relinquishing his right to return to Palestine". There is no sense behind this propaganda but much emotion - which is far more powerful, and increased pressure from some sources against reintegration may be expected in the future. To all this may be added a fear of the new Government to whom they will be handed over; though the refugees primarily blame the UN, the U.K., and the U.S.A. for their misfortunes, nevertheless the Syrian Government is known to the refugees to be particularly strict and none of their own Government is popular with the refugees - unless the Sultanates and Sheikhdoms of the South.

7. It is not easy to help the refugees to fight any of these fears but certain measures seem possible. The suggestions are made in the same order as that in which the fears have been invoked, rather than in one of chronology or importance.

8. One measure to fight the psychological fears will be to arrange as far as possible in reintegration for friends to go together, preferably those who lived together in Palestine, but failing that those who have been together in refuge.

9. Additionally it should be ensured that refugee villages be situated among people of their own religion and sect.

10. Further, as far as is possible, people should go to the same type of Agricultural work as they knew before and also, when this can be done, which will not be very often, to the same type of territory.

11. Though these measures cannot be taken till space is available for refugees, the latter should know <u>from the start</u> that they are firmly envisaged in our plans.

12. To soften the open spaces and create a more 'homely' atmosphere, the planting of trees at all the settlements will be a help, but the benefit will come in the future and the Arab does not look forward to any extent. (The preparation of nurseries might well have been done long ago and should be pressed on with now).

13. Once we have an actual village built and occupied, models might be made of it and shown at camps where recruitment is to take place. Such models would, of course, explain the amenities being offered - mosque, school, clinic, market, etc.

14. If it were possible to situate a large group of settlements round a market town this would obviously be of great value but U.S. Economic Aid or the Government would have to help to pay for the roads, etc.

15. The suggestions in 13 and 14 above might help with economic fears also but the major measure would be to use great caution in withdrawing ration cards until such time as the refugees are established. The move might then fairly be described as one to a place of greater amenity where food can be grown, money earned, etc. etc.

16. When the refugee's "Relief" ration card is withdrawn or replaced by a "Reintegration" ration card he should be issued with a "Refugee Card", which should have a permanent and official look and should be so ordered that it could be used as an identity card (having a photo) and <u>could</u> serve, as evidence of his having been a refugee on UNRWA rolls, if the occasion arose for return to rations, or to support any claim he might have to make about compensation, or repatriation. (Incidentally, such cards might well be a help in getting off the ration lists those who are self-reintegrated).

17. To fight political fears, once the Syrian Government agrees to settlement, the first step would be to ask the Government to stop the dissemination of anti-reintegration propaganda among the refugees and to assist UNRWA in providing counter propaganda.

18. The local governments should be asked to:

(a) Exert pressure on the Press, or at least let it know that their official view is now in favour of reintegration and that they consider this measure to be in the interests of the country.

(b) Make this view clear also to the Deuxièmes Bureaux, Suretés Générales, Police and Armed Forces so that individual members of these forces do not work against the programme. It is noticeable that through lack of information the ordinary member of the armed forces is often two steps behind Government policy.

19. The policy and its implications should be carefully explained to all UNRWA Palestinian employees down to, and particularly Camp Leaders, who should be encouraged to express doubts and ask questions. They should be asked to do their very best to combat hostility to the programme and to encourage a positive attitude towards it. During discussion with them they might be asked their views on the best way to influence the refugees' opinions.

20. By the judicious use of the Press for paid advertisements on matters of public interest UNRWA might well influence it to take a more favourable attitude.

21. An indirect method of rousing the Arab from his "refugee state of mind" would be the use of the cinema to show him films relating to e.g. improved agriculture, public health, interspersed if possible by some lighter material. Possibly cinema vans and films could be borrowed from the various Legations. The films of course need not necessarily refer to the Near East.

22. Any contract or agreement that the refugee may be asked to sign should contain a clear statement in simple Arabic that "According to Resolution xyz of UNO the acceptance of this holding, loan, etc., alters in no way whatever any right of the refugee to return to his homeland or to accept compensation for his property therein".

23. There is little doubt that the most important political move of all would be tackling the Sheikhs and Mukhtars and (as the Director so excellently put it) "rewarding them for their advice". Here there are three different groups to tackle, the townsmen, the fellahîn, and the tribesmen. The first are likely to be largely individual and difficult to reach, the second have mukhtars but each mukhtar serves only a relatively small number and there will be many of them to be tackled. The tribes, on the other hand, will need to be approached only through the paramount sheikhs of qabâ:il or at most the sheikhs of (ashâ:ir.

24. To take the tribes first, the paramount sheikhs are men of substance and, usually, education and could be tackled individually. The Reward for Advice would weigh heavily with many of them. They could be taken to the suggested sites and if these were near other tribal lands introduced to the nearest local tribal leaders. They themselves would doubtless state whether they wanted an UNRWA representative at any majlis held by them with the sheikhs of the (ashâ:ir.

25. It is fitting to stress here the importance of dealing with the tribes early for several reasons:-

(a) They are easier to tackle.
(b) They still carry considerable prestige and a favourable decision by them would carry weight with the fellahin.
(c) As they are likely either to move in a body or not at all and as some of our qabâ:il number from 5,000 to 10,000 persons they need a largish space.

26. The mukhtars being more numerous and less educated probably present a more difficult problem. A good Arabist would be required, knowing his men, and would probably have to pitch a tent in each camp for some time. He would probably have to take chosen representatives of the mukhtars to see the sites.

27. It is not easy to see any special way of tackling the townsfolk until it comes to persuasion by "move or else your ration card ...". On the other hand, some seemed less intransigeant than other groups.

28. Possibly action might now be taken as follows:

(1) Explain the plan and the implications of reintegration to UNRWA employees (possibly not at present as far down as camp leaders?), but with instructions not to try propaganda on refugees at present.

(2) Approach Governments for their agreement to and help in persuasion of refugees on lines given in par. 17, 18, 23-27.

(3) Go into question of getting films to show in refugee camps with USA and French Missions, British Council, I.P.C., etc., and if available ask Governments if they agree.

(4) Go further into question of a 'refugee card' (which I believe already is in use in Jordan).

29. Anything else would depend on result of 28 (2) above.

H.F. Knight

28 February 1952.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(EE 1826/11) 18th April, 1952.

OUTFILE

You recently sent us a copy of your paper No. ADCOM 173 of February 28th on certain suggestions to combat some psychological difficulties of resettlement in Syria.

2. We asked our Information Policy Department to comment on paragraph 28(3) of this paper. They have minuted that "Films are already being shown in the Jordan camps by our Amman mobile unit. This is shortly, we hope, to be joined by another unit (from Persia). In Syria the attitude of the authorities has made film work impossible, but we will do all we can to help as and when it becomes possible."

(C. M. Waterlow)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I.,
C.S.I., C.I.E.,
British Legation,
Beirut.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/12

Mr Bromley, Bagdad. to Mr Evans.

(1822/26/52)

18. 3. 52.

24. 3. 52.

Resettlement in Iraq

Record of a meeting Sir H. Knight had with Shakir al Wadi, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter is much against the resettlement of refugees in Iraq

Copied) Beirut, ~~Bdd~~ Cairo & Fayid

Last Paper

(Minutes)

See also -/13

Draft reply

Eastern Dept. (Mr. Rhodes)

PaR. 28/3

[signature] 28/3

CW 29/3

Reference

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Mr Bromley, Bagdad from Mr Evans. 28 Mar.

Copy) Sir H. Knight. Beirut Amman. 28 Mar.

(Action completed) [signature] 31/3

(Index) [signature] 30/5

Next Paper

37613

E 1822/12

British Embassy,
BAGDAD.
18th March, 1952.

1822/26/52

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Evans,

By now you will probably have received direct from Sir Henry Knight a record of his meeting with Fadhil Jamali during which they discussed the general question of the settlement of the Arab refugees.

2. The day after Sir Henry Knight arrived in Bagdad the Ambassador took him to call on Shakir al Wadi, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sir Henry explained to Shakir al Wadi what his problems were regarding refugees. Shakir al Wadi adopted an almost entirely negative attitude on the whole subject. He began by explaining how well the Iraqis were treating their refugees and claimed that they were living better than the Iraqis themselves. Attempts to put refugees on the land had failed, however, as the refugees themselves had been unwilling to be settled in this way. Shakir al Wadi thought this quite understandable as settlement on the land in Iraq would imply that all hope of their returning to their homes had been given up. The Ambassador suggested that as economic development progressed, Iraq would need more people both to carry out the schemes and to live on the new cultivable land, but the Acting Foreign Minister alleged that the development plans had been devised on the basis of Iraq's own population: the Iraqis would be indignant if Iraqi land were given to outsiders.

3. Shakir al Wadi appeared to have no knowledge of the resolution on the refugees recently passed by the United Nations Assembly, but at the mention of the United Nations he said that there could be no progress over the refugee problem unless the past decisions of the United Nations were implemented and the refugees enabled to return to their homes. He also stressed the danger that the refugees presented from the point of view of communist propaganda. His only solution to this problem was that they should be allowed to return to their homes. He added that the Iraq Government were not anxious to add to the population of the country persons who might already be affected by communism and who might cause unrest in Iraq. I think that this is a point which would seriously exercise the Iraq Government if ever the question of Iraq taking more refugees came to be considered as a practical proposition. It is believed here that in the course of the investigations into King Abdullah's murder lists were discovered of the next victims and these included the Regent and Nuri.

4. It/

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

4. It is disappointing that a Cabinet Minister in Iraq should speak on this subject in such unrealistic terms. But Shakir al Wadi, though Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, seems to have little say in the formulation of Iraq's foreign policy and he is regarded as one of the Ministers most strongly opposed to any settlement of refugees in Iraq.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and B.M.E.O. at Fayid and Cairo.

Yours ever,

T.E. Bromley

(T.E. BROMLEY)

Registry
No. EE 1826/12

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open~~

T.E.E.

Draft. Letter to:

T.E. Bromley, Esq,
Bagdad.

(from:

Mr. T.E. Evans)

Copies to:

Sir H. Knight,
KCSI.,CSI.,CIE.,
Beirut.

The Chancery,
Amman.

E 1028/4

E 9 18216/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(27274) Wt. 22831—216 325m 11/50 G.S. St.

By bag 29/3 Sat.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

March, 1952.

Thank you for your letter 1822/26/52 of the 18th March regarding Sir Henry Knight's visit to Iraq in connection with the Arab refugee problem.

2. We have now received a copy of the record of Knight's talk with Jamali, whose attitude, as you know, was as unhelpful as, if not more so than, that of Shakir al Wadi. It is perhaps unfortunate that Knight was only able to see such die-hards as Jamali and Al Wadi.

3. What we should be most interested to have would be Nuri's thinking on the refugee problem. You will have seen Amman telegram No. 105 of the 20th March reporting the Jordan Prime Minister's suggestion that we should make an approach to the Iraq Government with a view to their facilitating the entry and resettlement of refugees in Iraq. As the Ambassador pointed out to Shakir al Wadi, labour shortage is likely to develop when the 5 year plan gets under way, and it is interesting to know that about 2,500 refugees have, in the last few months, infiltrated from Jordan and Syria and are managing to find something to do in Bagdad (Knight's letter AC1 of the 18th March). Our ~~view~~ guess, for what it is worth, is that the labour demand is not likely to be keenly felt for two years or so. Nevertheless, if the Iraq Government could be induced to indicate that, pending their repatriation (some such face saver would presumably be necessary), Palestine

/refugees

refugees would be welcome to avail themselves of any work possibilities in Iraq, it would help greatly. We should be glad to know whether you think there is any chance of Nuri saying something on these lines on a suitable occasion.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and to the Chancery at Amman.

CW 28/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(EE 1826/12)

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

28th March, 1952.

Thank you for your letter 1822/26/52 of the 18th March regarding Sir Henry Knight's visit to Iraq in connection with the Arab refugee problem.

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4. I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and to the Chancery at Amman.

(T. E. Evans)

T. E. Bromley, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Bagdad.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

1952

PALESTINE

E E 1826/15

FROM

Mr Furlonge

Amman.

No. to Sir J. Bowker

Dated (18204/4)

Received in Registry— 31/3. R. 7/4.

Resettlement

Discusses the present United Nations policy in dealing with the refugees & what should be done should the scheme fail.

Dpt of BMEO, W'Ven. & Damascus.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Copy to Sir H Knight for obs. 12/4

(Action completed) 8J 24/5.

(Index) 30/5.

MINUTES

Copies of this letter & of Sir T Rapp's letter on -/16 should, I think, go to Sir H Knight.

M. Ross

M.E.S (c gain)

[signature] 9/4

I have much sympathy for Mr. Furlonge's suggestion.

A Dm Ross

9/4

I, too, think there is much to be said for Mr. Furlonge's suggestion, possibly prefaced by the Tripartite investigation and subsequent announcement suggested by Sir Thomas Rapp. The bother is that the main burden falls on Jordan. I should be grateful for Mr. Evans's views on how we should deal with this suggestion. I think copies of the two letters should certainly go to Sir H. Knight with a request for his comments. At some fairly early stage we should, I think, discuss with the Americans.

R. J. B.

9th April, 1952.

As Sir J. Bowker points out, the weakness in the argument is the burden which the action proposed would put on Jordan. Please see separate minute & draft.

[signature] 21/5 [signature] 17/4

39984

18204/4

British Legation,
Amman.

EE 1826/15

CONFIDENTIAL

31st March 1952.

My dear Jim,

Those of us who have dealt with the Palestine refugee problem during the last two or three years have never, I think, felt optimistic over the prospects of achieving a satisfactory solution. The most we have ever hoped for was that there were some prospects of at least making progress towards an eventual solution. These hopes seem in some quarters to have been raised by the adoption at the last General Assembly of the 250 million dollar 3-year programme of reintegration. Unfortunately, my experience since I have come here has convinced me that, as things are, there is no hope of any sensible progress on these lines, and that in fact the United Nations policy in the matter has got into a cul-de-sac from which it must be extricated if, a year or so hence, the situation is not to be a great deal worse than even it is today.

2. The United Nations policy, as I understand it, is based on the hopes

(a) that something like 100,000 of the 450,000 refugees in Jordan can be settled somewhere in Jordan territory.

(b) That the remainder (say 350,000), plus the 200,000 in the Gaza Strip, plus an unspecified number unabsorbable in the Lebanon, can eventually be transferred to Syria (possibly a few to Iraq) and there resettled, either in areas developed in cooperation between the Syrian Government and the various agencies, or in areas in which a demand for labour has been created by the attraction of some of their former inhabitants to the newly-developed areas.

3. The UNRWA are accordingly trying (i) to commit before June 30th as much as possible of the funds voted by the Assembly Resolution on economic projects in Jordan and the Lebanon directly related to the resettlement of refugees

(ii) to secure the consent and cooperation of the Syrian Government for similar action in Syria.

4. My own information leads me to submit the following propositions:-

A. There is no hope of resettling in Jordan, in any foreseeable future, more than a fraction of the 100,000. The number to be removed out of Jordan for resettlement elsewhere is therefore likely to exceed 400,000.

B. Whatever the chances of inducing the Syrian Government to cooperate loyally and effectively with the UNRWA in large schemes of economic development in Syria, there is no hope, in any foreseeable future, of any Syrian Government agreeing to admit any appreciable number of refugees from Jordan or the Gaza Strip.

...../C.

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

C. In any case, the vast majority of the Jordan refugees, so long as they are fed by UNRWA, will not agree to go to Syria or elsewhere further away from Palestine, and no Jordan Government will dare to press them to do so.

5. The position would not, in my view, be affected by a settlement between Israel and the Arabs, even in the unlikely event of one being achieved in the next year or two. It would be affected if Israel were to pay full compensation; but agreement between Israel and the Arabs on the amount of compensation payable is almost inconceivable, and anyhow Israel has no money.

6. In my view, therefore, the United Nations are in the nightmare position of supporting a dead weight of refugees, which there is no hope of lightening, for an unlimited period. Since the United States and the United Kingdom are nowadays the only substantial contributors, this means that the present drain on our resources will continue indefinitely. We are gaining no credit with the Arabs, who have come to regard it as a right that we should support their refugee brethern and are depriving ourselves of funds which could infinitely better be expended on the defence or economic development of the Middle East.

7. There is, I fear, a real danger that in all this we are being misled by the UNRWA, whose director is exuding an optimism which I and everyone else here consider totally unfounded. The Agency's reports fail to bring out the almost ludicrous disparity between what it has accomplished, or even what it is at present trying to accomplish, in the matter of reintegration, and the size of the problem.

8. Responsibility for this state of affairs must primarily rest, in varying measure, with the Arab Governments, who have consistently failed either to cooperate in the Agency's attempts at reintegration or to educate the refugees in the facts of life. If then we are to emerge from the present cul-de-sac, it seems to me essential that the Arab States, and incidentally the refugees themselves, should be given a jolt; at present the former have no real incentive to act, and the latter for the most part now regard themselves as having a prescriptive right to be supported for the rest of their lives.

9. I took advantage of my visit to Damascus last weekend to discuss the above with Montagu-Pollock and then, at his suggestion, with the United States Minister, Cannon. Montagu-Pollock entirely agrees with proposition B in paragraph 4 above; Cannon, while not quite so certain that the present Syrian Government will never admit refugees, agrees that it is highly uncertain whether they ever will, and if so when. We all agree with the necessity of giving a jolt to the Arab refugees and the Governments.

10. In the course of a long off-the-record discussion, we thrashed out the following tentative ideas with which I understood Montagu-Pollock generally agreed and Cannon, though not committing himself seemed impressed.

Stage I. We and the Americans should unofficially warn the Syrian Government that if the present U.N. scheme failed we much doubted whether any money for reintegration would be forthcoming in following years, so that they would be most unwise not to cooperate fully straight away. (Presumably warnings in suitable terms could be addressed to the other Arab Governments).

...../Stage II

Stage II. If after, say, three months there were still no positive signs that the Arab Governments were going to cooperate effectively, we and the Americans would discuss with a view to concerting action at the next Assembly. This action would be on the following lines. We would state that the Arab Governments having, by their lack of cooperation, prevented the reintegration plans from being effectively pursued, we had decided that we were not prepared to continue to finance the continued subsistence of the refugees through the UNRWA. It would therefore be necessary for the Arab Governments, as from a specified date which should not be too far ahead, to take over full responsibility for this subsistence. If any Arab Government felt itself unable to finance this subsistence, it would be at liberty to apply to the United Nations for a pro rata share of the funds subscribed for the purpose which would not however during the first year exceed what UNRWA had spent on subsistence in that country during the present year. We would, however, warn the Arab Governments that whatever responsibility we might be deemed to have had for the refugees, we felt that a term must be placed on this responsibility, and we proposed therefore to taper off our future contributions for refugee subsistence so that they would cease after a specified period, say 5 years. It was therefore up to the Arab Governments during that period to find a means of solving the problem. If any of them considered that they could only do this by long-term economic development, they were at liberty to apply separately to the sources of assistence already open to them, i.e., Point IV, the International Bank, and (in the case of Jordan) H.M.G.

11. It will be seen that this programme has the following definite advantages:-

(a) It provides the necessary incentive to the Arab Governments to tackle the problem seriously; and to the refugees to take any available work, because they would presumably be less well fed by the Governments than by UNRWA.

(b) It would prevent the Arab Governments from refusing to take over responsibility for subsistence, since it would be clear to them that no money would be subscribed unless they did.

(c) It would put a limit on the unprofitable drain on our and U.S. resources, while leaving us full opportunity to devote as much money as we could afford on economic development which would profit the countries as a whole.

12. There are two obvious dangers

(a) That the refugees would be so ineffectually dealt with by the Governments that they would get out of hand and constitute a serious threat to the internal security and stability of the Middle East, and

(b) That the abrogation by the U.N. (which in effect means by the U.S. and ourselves) of direct responsibility for the refugees would so adversely affect the Arab States as to endanger our chances of securing their cooperation in Middle East defence. I suggest, however, that in balance these dangers are less than those inherent in the present policy. As regards (a), in Jordan at least the refugees' morale is so low, and the security forces

..../so effective

so effective, that I believe that the situation could be held. As for (b) Jordan cooperation in our Middle East defence plans is virtually assured so long as we pay the subsidy to the Arab Legion; Iraq would not be affected as it has no refugees; the Lebanese are in no position to refuse cooperation when we require it; and the Syrians in their present mood will not cooperate with anyone or anything.

13. I do not know whether Cannon will have reported these ideas, which we made clear were entirely our own and had not been discussed with London. In any event, you will no doubt feel that, if they are considered worth pursuing at all, the first step is to discuss with the Americans, since without their agreement obviously we can do nothing. Personally I feel that the situation is so unpromising and potentially dangerous that it would be worth-while making every effort to thrash out with them some course of action such as the above.

14. I am sending copies of this letter to Rapp, Franks, and Montagu-Pollock.

Yours ever,

Geoffrey Furlonge

(G.W.Furlonge)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/13

Sir H. Knight.
To Beirut.
To Mr Evans.

AC 189.

17. 3. 52.
24. 3. 52.

Resettlement in Iraq.

Encloses note of a talk which he & Sir J. Trouttbeck had with Fadhil Jamali on 13th March, re. resettlement in Iraq.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

The old stuff
see also -/12

[illegible] 28/3

Reference

-/12

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

[illegible] 31/3

(Index)

[illegible] 30/5

Next Paper

37613

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

(AC 189)

CONFIDENTIAL

17th March, 1952.

E 1826/13

My dear Evans,

I enclose a note of a talk which Troutbeck and I had with Fadhil Jamali last Thursday in Bagdad.

2. Troutbeck tells me that the policy of Iraq regarding refugees will be settled by Nuri Sayid so long as he is Prime Minister, and not by Jamali or anybody else.

3. I am inclined to think that in Paris Jamali had what Troutbeck termed a "lucid interval" during some of our round-table discussion, but finally repented of his temporary heresy, and felt bound to give us the speech he made on the 26th.

4. I do not think any action is needed on this, but I thought you might be interested.

Yours sincerely,

H Knight

(H. F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Bagdad, at Jamali's house
13th March, 1952

H.M. Ambassador, Bagdad

Fadhil Jamali

H.F. Knight

1. After I had told Jamali that I was glad to have the opportunity to thank him personally for his help in reaching compromise on the Palestine Conciliation and Refugee Resolution in Paris, and to ask his advice as to the next step, Jamali opened up on the whole Palestine question from the beginning.

2. He said that there could be no peace in the ~~north-~~ Near East without the prior settlement of the Arab refugee problem and no solution of the refugee problem until the past United Nations resolutions had been put into force. The Arabs are quite ready to come to terms with Israel and the Western Powers, provided Israel agrees to implement these United Nations resolutions.

3. He suggested that Israel should agree

(i) to receive some refugees

(ii) to relinquish ~~at least~~ Western Galilee, part of the "Triangle", and most of the Nejeb, which Israel had occupied in violation of the United Nations resolutions,

that, if Israel was not prepared to do this, U.S.A. should cut off all supply of funds, both official and non-official, till Israel should agree.

4. It was suggested to him that as a matter of practical politics the existence of Israel as a State must now be accepted, and he seemed prepared to admit that, provided the boundaries were fixed to make Israel a smaller self-contained State as suggested in the Bernadotte plan. He seemed unable to contemplate the possibility of Israel refusing to comply with United Nations resolutions if backed by U.S.A. pressure, or the possibility of U.S.A. being unwilling to apply such pressure. His view appeared to be that neither United Nations, U.S.A. nor United Kingdom could refuse to carry out such an obvious measure of justice.

5. Without Israel being compelled to accept the above, there is no hope of peace or Arab co-operation with the Western Powers, and meanwhile U.S.A. and U.K. are wasting their money in spending it for the benefit of the Arab States, as the money does not affect the Arab States' bitterness at the betrayal of the Palestine Arabs. If the resolutions be implemented, the bitterness would vanish. In their own interests and to prevent the spread

of Communism/

of Communism the U.S.A. and the U.K. should arrange for action as above.

6. (It was clearly useless to discuss with him the practical difficulty - or impossibility - of his proposals).

7. He said that recently at Beirut he had had a meeting with refugees and their leaders at Beirut and was there informed that Jewish influence in U.S.A. had insisted that UNRWA should prevent any possible re-settlement of refugees in Jordan, but should settle refugees as far as possible from Israel, in the Syrian Jezireh and Iraq, and that Jewish influence within UNRWA itself was working against the interests of the refugees. So long as this continued, refugees would refuse to be resettled by UNRWA and he agreed with their view. (Further he said that no U.S.A. officials in UNRWA, Point Four, etc., are sent anywhere in the Near East unless they are passed as pro-Israeli by Jewish influence in the U.S.A.).

8. He personally did not fear Jewish armed intervention, but feared that, if peace be made with Israel without Israel having proved its pacific intentions by accepting some repatriation and surrender of the areas mentioned, pacific penetration by Israel would be the ruin of the Arab countries.

9. In his view the only way of settling the refugee question is to begin with the original political problem, and, until repatriation and some restoration of territory had been agreed to by, or imposed upon, Israel, it is useless to try to settle refugees, and till then UNRWA's task is impossible. Once repatriation and boundary adjustment has been accepted, then UNRWA must first settle as many refugees as possible in Jordan, especially on the West of the Jordan, even though it should cost as much to settle refugees there as Israel spends on developing the resources of Israel and settling Jewish refugees. Only after the bulk of the refugees had either been repatriated to Israel or settled in Jordan, would it be possible to offer to move such of the remaining refugees who might wish to settle in Syria or Iraq.

10. He asked that his views be pressed on higher ~~Israeli~~ level authorities as the only solution.

11. (It was not possible to get his appreciation of the impossibility of settling large numbers of refugees in poverty-stricken Jordan, which he regarded as a satellite of the U.K. bound to do whatever the U.K. might order).

12. Pending a decision on the question of repatriation and boundary adjustment, UNRWA must

(i) provide work for refugees and pay them wages, and

(ii)/

(ii) settle refugees in Western Galilee where there are refugees' former lands not yet occupied by Jews.

If Israel refused such repatriation XXXX into Israel, then UNRWA must inform its Governments that no resettlement of refugees is possible and that it cannot carry out its task.

13. To the suggestion that his view did not correspond to the U.N. General Assembly resolution of January 26th 1952, for which all the Arab States had voted, he gave the ingenuous or disingenuous reply that, as this resolution mentioned previous U.N. resolutions and the right to repatriation, he was entitled to interpret the implementation of this resolution as dependant on the prior implementation of all previous U.N. resolutions - (the implication apparently being that the Arab States in Paris had successfully double-crossed the Western Powers and are not prepared to co-operate with UNRWA in providing "homes and jobs" for refugees).

14. In his view no settlement of refugees can be made, though he seemed to imply that providing means for refugees to earn their own living, or for them to work on the land as tenants would be permissible. For fear of their own public opinion no Arab Government can now accept, or suggest settlement of refugees outside of Palestine.

15. As regards UNRWA itself, he said

(i) UNRWA must treat the refugees as human beings and not, as at present, as cattle;

(ii) UNRWA must cut down its international staff and appoint refugees in their place;

(iii) UNRWA must consult with, and co-operate with the elected leaders of the refugees.

16. (It was impracticable, and obviously useless, to argue against convictions so strongly held, however eroneous. I told Jamali, however, that he was wrong in supposing that U.S.A. was opposing UNRWA's plans for Jordan, and H.M. Ambassador explained that Jordan is not a mere satellite of the U.K. I could not, however, explain that U.S.A. is pressing UNRWA for a plan to spend 10 million dollars in Jordan immediately, for we do not know if Jordan Government will accept the plan or not.

17. One does not know how far Jamali's view is that of the Government or Iraq or of the other Arab States. Iraq is of course far less vitally concerned with the XXXXXX refugee problem than Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt or Syria. Their views will presumably be made clear in time. But what Jamali said today may explain his intemperate speech in the U.N. General Assembly on January 26th, which contrasted with the attitude of the other Arab States and with his own of a few days previously. In any case

it is of interest as giving an Arab point of view.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/14

FROM

Chancery, Amman.

~~D~~ M.E.S.

No. (22201/23)

Dated 24.3.52.

Received in Registry— 31.3.52.

Resettlement in Jordan.

Discusses the crippling effect of some of the Resettlement directives which the Jordan office of U.N.R.W.A. have received.

References

EE1826/8 10

MINUTES

Letter to Amman issued

M. Hunter June 4/4

M 3/4

(Print)

(How disposed of)

~~Mr~~ Mr Walker, Amman

for Mr Evans 2 April

Copy/ Sir H. Knight, Beirut

Dev. Div, Beirut

Greenhill, W'Von

2 April

(Action completed)

4/4

(Index)

28/4

40429

22201/23

CONFIDENTIAL

E

British Legation,
Amman.

24th March 1952.

E 1826/14

Dear Middle East Secretariat,

We refer to your letter EE 1826/8 of 12th March to Sir Henry Knight regarding the plans of UNRWA for resettlement in Jordan. These plans are as yet too vague to merit detailed comment.

EE 1826/10

2. But in the light of Colonel Russell Edmunds letter to Miss Waterlow (IF 48/018 of 11th March) we think it worthwhile to say a word on the crippling effect of some of the Resettlement directives which the Jordan office of UNRWA have received. At the outset UNRWA undertook public works largely because true resettlement projects were not worked out and ready. As a result of criticism that no refugees were resettled by these public works, the order was issued: "No more public works". A new directive was received that money was to be spent only on direct resettlement of refugees. Before any project was to be begun, the cost was to be compared with the number of refugees resettled. This policy is extremely difficult to carry out in Jordan where the openings for resettlement apart from absorption by raising the economic standard of the country are so few. Resettlement efforts were still further crippled by the accompanying instruction that UNRWA was not to undertake the main resettlement projects but to undertake the works (public?) around the periphery of the main project which was to be financed by bilateral aid. The policy enshrined in these instructions would have been reasonable if there existed a core round which UNRWA could work. But the bilateral programmes are only beginning. It is unknown how much the American programme will amount to next year, or whether any further British money will be available. And in any case the whole picture looks upside down when we add that the funds of which the centre can dispose for the main projects are at the most 9 million dollars while the periphery may have 20 million dollars. This disparity is increased by the large proportion of the American Point 4 programme which is to be devoted to activities very far from the centre such as health and educational programmes.

3. As can be seen in the schedule of UNRWA resettlement projects this instruction to keep on the periphery has not been entirely adhered to. It cannot be. Nor is it easy in the case of Jordan to adhere to the directive of "aid to refugees only". Insofar as this programme shows any elasticity it is healthy and realistic. It is more than time that the bonds restricting UNRWA economic activities were broken. However the whole position of resettlement through UNRWA is so disturbing that Her Majesty's Minister is considering writing a basic reappreciation of methods for dealing with the refugee problem.

4. We are copying this letter to Sir Henry Knight in Beirut, Development Division of B.M.E.O., Cairo, and to Greenhill in Washington.

Yours ever,
Amman Chancery.

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

(ME 1826/14)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

2nd April, 1952.

OUTFILE

Your letter 22201/23 of the 24th March regarding UNRWA's resettlement plans for Jordan.

2. It is, I think, important to understand exactly what the Agency aim at doing under the 3 year programme. This is outlined as follows in Annex A of the Special Report of the Director and Advisory Commission, submitted to the General Assembly at the last session.

"General objectives.

To help refugees obtain adequate housing and employment.
Refugees will move from camps and temporary shelter to suburban housing projects and rural villages.
They will move from ration lines to self-supporting employment.
The general intention is to make refugees economic assets of Near East countries.

Specific programmes.

The Near East governments and the Agency will co-operate in the following activities:

(a) Helping refugees find employment where their services are needed and which does not conflict with employment needs of nationals;
(b) Training refugees for service in fields where there is a shortage of trained personnel;
(c) Making loans to refugees to establish them in gainful enterprises;
(d) Building houses in and near cities, villages or industries where jobs may be available;
(e) Creating rural villages in areas where land is available for cultivation;
(f) Developing agricultural lands through well-drilling, irrigation works, access roads and similar small works."

3. The programme is thus quite elastic and a considerable measure of "indirect resettlement" is envisaged. The trouble is not so much the programme itself as the apparent inability of the Agency and of the Jordan Government to get on with it. This applies particularly to housing, which is a very important part of the programme.

4. Against this background the £20 m. allocated to reintegration in Jordan is not perhaps so disproportionate. If this large sum were devoted to housing alone, not more than 20,000 houses would be constructed. The average cost of building a house and settling a refugee family in it will probably work out at about £1,000 - please see the section on Typical Costs in Annex B of the Special Report. It should also be remembered that, as also indicated in Annex B, it is not envisaged that more than half of the amount committed will actually be spent during the first year.

/5. ...

M. T. Walker, Esq.,
British Legation,
Amman

5. What is perhaps even more disturbing than the passivity of the Agency and the Jordan Government is the fact that a basic assumption of the programme is only partially provided for. The 3 year programme assumes that resettlement projects would be paralleled by programmes of economic development financed by Middle East Governments with assistance from the International Bank and other sources. Large numbers of refugees can only be resettled within the framework of economic development. Unfortunately, it is only in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Jordan that such development is in hand. Syria, where considerable economic resources await development and where the physical opportunities of early refugee resettlement are greatest, has no oil revenues to draw on, and the offers of assistance for economic development so far made by the International Bank and the Americans have not proved sufficiently attractive to the Syrians. We have so far been unable to offer any financial aid to Syria.

6. The lack of progress in the economic field in Syria is particularly unfortunate as, owing to the uncertain internal political situation in the country, Syrian co-operation with UNRWA may well be withheld or given merely on a token basis. On the other hand, increased economic activity in Syria, such as would result from a substantial development programme, would have the effect of creating a demand for labour that could not be satisfied within the country and would attract refugees unobtrusively and without raising political issues.

7. The Iraqi 5 year Development Programme is expected to reveal a shortage of labour in the country, and opportunities of refugee absorption are likely to develop. Some 2,500 refugees have, as you know, recently infiltrated from Jordan and Syria and have succeeded in finding some employment in Bagdad. Our guess is, however, that the demand for labour in Iraq is not likely to be keenly felt for at least 3 years and, as landless Iraqis will naturally be given priority, it may be as much as 10 years before Palestine refugees can be resettled on the land in Iraq.

8. As has been long recognized, Syria is the key to the problem. About 300,000 refugees from Jordan will have to be transferred before they can be resettled (the total number of refugees that will have to be moved is probably about 600,000). The absence of a substantial development programme in Syria and of adequate financial support for it is thus of direct concern to those responsible for resettlement of refugees, not least those in Jordan.

9. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Henry Knight and the Development Division of the British Middle East Office in Beirut and to Denis Greenhill in Washington.

(T. E. Evans)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/16

FROM

Mr Rogers, BMEO Fayid to Sir J. Bowker.

No. 182/38/1

Dated

Received in Registry— 5. 4. 52. 8. 4. 52.

U.N. Policy - Palestine Refugees.

Encloses draft letter from Sir T. Rapp to Sir J. Bowker, on the UNRWA policy & the misleading report given by Mr Blandford to U.N.O.

Copied Amman, Washington, Damascus.

References

EE 1826/15
25.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

copy Sir H. Knight, Beirut for obs. (on -/15) 12/4

(Dft) Mr Furlonge, Amman, from Sir J. Bowker. 19 apl.

(Copy) Sir T. Rapp, Fayid. Sir O. Franks, W'ton. Mr Pollock, Damascus. Sir H. Knight, Beirut. 19 apl.

(Action completed) 20/5.

(Index) 30/5.

MINUTES

Pl see my minute of 9/4 on -/15

[signature] 9/4

The suggested Tripartite investigation & statement of policy would not overcome the difficulties referred to in Sir J. Bowkers minute on -/15 & my minute of 16/4. EE1826/25

[signature] 17/4

CW 16/5

39984

Enter 200

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE.
~~10 SHARIA TOLUMBAT~~
~~CAIRO~~
Political Division,
G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.17.

182/38/1

CONFIDENTIAL

Eastern Dept to enter & consider in connection with Mr. Furlonge's minute.

5th April, 1952.

E E1826/16

Dear Sir James,

I enclose the text of a letter which Sir Thomas Rapp dictated yesterday and which he instructed should leave by today's bag. Unfortunately Sir Thomas had to leave Fayid for Port Said before the letter was available to be signed. It is, however, his draft and I am therefore sending it to you under cover of this note.

Yours sincerely,

G.F.R.

(G.F. RODGERS)

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Bap on 124

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
~~XOXSHARIAXIOLUMBAI~~,
~~CAIRO~~
Political Division,
G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.17.

1/2430
1/3-30

182/38/1

CONFIDENTIAL

1C/pe.

5th April, 1952.

EE 1826/15

Furlonge's letter 18204/4 of March 31st last to you on the Palestinian refugee problem expressed a point of view which is gaining increased acceptance and his diagnosis of the situation corresponds generally to the impressions conveyed to me by the various members of the Development Division who have visited the countries concerned in recent months.

2. I have moreover heard many suggestions that the Blandford Special Report to UNO was a misleading one, was known by many members of UNWRAP to be misleading, and that the reason why it was put forward as an agreed report was that it constituted the only hope of achieving the dual objective of securing acceptance at Paris and the necessary continuing support from Congress. The elusive prospects of resettlement had therefore to be painted in rosy colours, hardly corresponding to the facts, and the burden of the refugees shown to be a diminishing one.

3. How far Blandford himself believed in the sincerity of this report I do not know as I have had no recent talks with him, but he is a born optimist and a salesman who exudes confidence in the goods he displays. Possibly his attitude was compounded mainly of politics and uncritical self-confidence. Keen, his deputy, expressed himself strongly to me in December last on the subject of his disagreement with Blandford's policy and reports, adding that he had twice offered his resignation in protest. I have also listened to many aspersions on Blandford from other sources as regards his policy, methods, lack of realism and failure to make good his promises. Unfortunately I have had no opportunity of discussing the report and the present position with Henry Knight, as I missed him on both the recent occasions when I was in Beirut. I hope to go into matters further however when I go there towards the end of this month and will then write you again.

4. I do not need to wait until then however to say that I agree entirely with Furlonge that unless a drastic change of policy takes place we are likely to be burdened indefinitely with the maintenance of the refugees (half of whom are below the age of 15) as useless and deteriorating outcasts, poisoning the countries which reluctantly harbour them. The Arabs for the most part still profess to regard the refugees as an American and British problem and responsibility, due to our Palestinian policy, and as one that calls for little or no co-operation on their side so long as the United Nations resolution affirming the right of return to Palestine etc., remains unimplemented. The human tragedy means little or nothing to them; what interests them more is the exploitation of political grievances.

5. The nature of the jolt to be administered to Arab States may not be easy to determine. Personally I am inclined to think that it cannot be separated from a public announcement made by ourselves, the United States and France that the United Nations resolution referred to is not capable of practical realisation, except perhaps

/for some

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

for some small degree of compensation and the return of a restricted number of Arabs to join families now in Israel. Such an announcement, which might follow the investigation of a body appointed by the tripartite guaranteed powers in virtue of the special responsibilities they have accepted and whose conclusions can with some confidence be foreseen, would in spite of the protests it would arouse condition both the Arab States and the refugees for the steps to be subsequently taken, which might then be on the lines suggested by Furlonge. But such an announcement appears to me to be an indispensable preliminary. Incidentally, it might have the further advantage of simplifying the issues between the Arab States and Israel.

6. The risk of impeding the development of Middle East defence plans would have to be taken, and, like Furlonge, I do not rate it high, even in the short term. Ultimately the solution of the refugee problem cannot but help them. In any case there is in the light of experience in the Middle East little to encourage the policy of allowing one desirable object to await the realisation of a still more desirable one.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Furlonge, Franks and Montagu-Pollock.

(T.C. RAPP)

Bag Bag 19/4

Registry No. EE1826/16

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted~~
~~Open~~

T.E.E.

Draft. Letter to:

G.W.
Mr. Furlonge, CMG OBE
Amman

(from:
Sir James Bowker)

Copies to:

Sir Thomas Rapp, Fayid.

Sir Oliver Franks, Washington.

Mr. Montagu-Pollock, Damascus.

Sir Henry Knight, Beirut.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
19 APR 1952
SENT TO TYPE 19/4
DESPATCHED

Wt. 11647/234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

April, 1952.

+4c. OUTFILE

Thank you for your letter 18204/4 of the 31st March on the subject of Palestine refugees. It has been read with great interest here, and both your analysis of the present position and the proposals which you make for future action are very valuable, particularly in preparing our minds for fuller consideration of the problem at the coming Conference of Her Majesty's Representatives.

2. ~~A copy~~ Copies of your letter and of Rapp's comments on it has been sent to ~~Sir Henry~~ Knight. Pending the receipt of his observations ~~we cannot do more than give~~ you may care to have our preliminary views.

3. To take your analysis first, our comments are briefly as follows:-

(i) Resettlement possibilities in Jordan are undoubtedly limited, but until a real effort is made it is not possible to say how many can be absorbed there.

(ii) The outlook in Syria is now slightly more promising. Knight recently reported that there were indications that the Syrians would accept refugees from Lebanon and Gaza (but apparently not from Jordan). The United States Embassy here have recently had information to the effect that on the 26th March the Head of the Syrian State told Blandford that he could go ahead with his plans for technical training, construction projects and resettlement of refugees. The settlement activity would begin after April 1st and would eventually absorb about one-third of the refugees in Syria.

/Colonel

Colonel Selo stressed that publicity should not be given, as otherwise Syria would discontinue co-operation, and that the refugees should be given the option in all cases of remaining on relief or participating in UNRWA projects. There is, unfortunately, no mention in this report of the acceptance of refugees from other territories, but if the offer is genuine it at least represents an essential preliminary to any more far-reaching co-operation in the future. As you know, the Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordan Governments are now pressing the Syrians to co-operate with the Agency. This is a considerable advance.

(iii) Until the refugees are actually offered concrete alternatives to camp life it cannot be known whether they will accept them or prefer to remain on relief. According to information here, the few resettlement possibilities which have been provided by UNRWA in Jordan are much sought after by the refugees.

(iv) We agree that the payment of compensation by Israel would materially alter the situation.

4. As regards the future, you envisage action in two stages.

I. We see no objection, in principle, to an unofficial warning to the Syrian Government on the subject of future funds. We doubt, however, whether such a warning would have much effect, particularly in the present state of Anglo-Syrian and American-Syrian relations. The

/Director

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Director of UNRWA has repeatedly made the point, as has no doubt Montagu-Pollock, in private conversation. Incidentally, both Montagu-Pollock and Knight recently rejected a suggestion that Blandford should be given diplomatic support in his negotiations with the Syrians. As regards the other Arab Governments, a warning in Amman and possibly in Beirut might have some effect. We doubt whether the Egyptians would pay much attention in present circumstances. On balance, therefore, we do not think that the present is an opportune time for warnings to the Arab Governments, the Jordan and Lebanese Governments possibly excepted. Less than three months have elapsed since the UNRWA plan was approved by the General Assembly, and there is much to be said for giving Blandford a chance to play his own hand.

II. There would clearly be no objection to our talking to the Americans in, say, three months' time with a view to concerting action at the next General Assembly. We doubt, however, whether putting a term to relief would advance matters. In the case of Syria the difficulty is that, as you know, there are only about 80,000 refugees, most of them already half integrated, in the country; and the Syrian Government can well afford to ignore the cutting off of supplies. The only result would be that any chance of co-operation between the Syrian Government and UNRWA and of the resettlement

a decision at the next assembly (even if it could be secured) is

/in

(35941)
(30841) 7568/163 50,000 6/48 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
9/171 85,000 11/48 " "
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

in Syria of refugees now in Jordan, Gaza and Lebanon would be lost. Unfortunately, they cannot be resettled anywhere else; and the plain fact is that in this matter we are almost entirely at the mercy of the Syrians. Egypt also could afford to ignore the sanction. The Egyptian Government is financially in a position to support the 200,000 refugees in Gaza; in the last resort they could, with little harm to themselves, let them starve. This leaves Lebanon and Jordan. In both these countries the refugees, who represent one-tenth and one-third of the population respectively, constitute a serious threat to the existing regimes. Neither Government, at least not the Jordan Government, has the means to support them. The sanction of cutting off supplies would therefore be very serious. In view of the limited resettlement possibilities in both countries, however, the result would not be be desired one. At the end of the five-year period of diminishing relief the bulk of the refugees there would still not be self-supporting. ~~and would~~ have to be maintained from outside sources. The alternative would be to let them starve and risk the threat to internal security. The Jordan Security Forces may be so effective that the situation could be held. We doubt, however, whether Her Majesty's Government could accept responsibility for such a situation before Parliament and world public opinion.

who are the most affected by the problem.

a few would no doubt find means of subsistence in Jordan and some would infiltrate & pick up jobs in Syria & Iraq. But unless the tempo of economic activity in these countries, particularly Syria, is greatly increased the number that can be absorbed is bound to be small. The refugees in Jordan (& Lebanon) would therefore

5. This does not mean that we are at all happy about the present situation or the outlook.

/Supporting

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Supporting action, which in the case of need might be developed into an alternative to the three-year plan, is certainly necessary. The plan itself in fact assumed that resettlement projects would be paralleled by large-scale development projects financed by local governments, the International Bank and friendly governments. This important aspect of the plan is often forgotten and unless provision is made for it, the plan will probably fail or be only very partially successful.

6. It must be recognised that the key to the solution of the problem lies in Syria, where nearly 1 million acres of new irrigated land could be brought into cultivation by development. Such development would create a demand for labour which could not be satisfied from within the country and would lead to the absorption of refugees unobtrusively and without raising political difficulties. What is required, in fact, is the reversal of the pre-war process when, as you know, great economic activity in Mandatory Palestine attracted labour from the surrounding countries. at this stage the

7. Unfortunately, apart from the difficulty of making the necessary finance available, there is the problem of inducing the present military rulers of Syria to accept it. As Montagu-Pollock has repeatedly pointed out, Syrian co-operation can probably only be bought at the price of military equipment for the Syrian Army, and this gets us into very deep water, as you well know.

8. I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours and to Knight at Beirut.

R.G. 19/4

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

19th April, 1952.

(EE 1826/16)

OUTFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for your letter 1820A/4 of the 31st March on the subject of Palestine refugees. It has been read with great interest here, and both your analysis of the present position and the proposals which you make for future action are very valuable, particularly in preparing our minds for fuller consideration of the problem at the coming Conference of Her Majesty's Representatives.

2. Copies of your letter and of Rapp's comments on it have been sent to Knight. Pending the receipt of his observations you may care to have our preliminary views.

3. To take your analysis first, our comments are briefly as follows:-

(i) Resettlement possibilities in Jordan are undoubtedly limited, but until a real effort is made it is not possible to say how may can be absorbed there.

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(iii) Until the refugees are actually offered concrete alternatives to camp life it cannot be known whether they will accept them or prefer to remain on relief. According to information here, the few resettlement possibilities which have been provided by UNRWA in Jordan are much sought after by the refugees.

(iv) We agree that the payment of compensation by Israel would materially alter the situation.

4./

G.W. Furlonge, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Amman.

4. As regards the future, you envisage action in two stages.

I. We see no objection, in principle, to an unofficial warning to the Syrian Government on the subject of future funds. We doubt, however, whether such a warning would have much effect, particularly in the present state of Anglo-Syrian and American-Syrian relations. The Director of UNRWA has repeatedly made the point, as has no doubt Montagu-Pollock, in private conversation. Incidentally, both Montagu-Pollock and Knight recently rejected a suggestion that Blandford should be given diplomatic support in his negotiations with the Syrians. As regards the other Arab Governments, a warning in Amman and possibly in Beirut might have some effect. We doubt whether the Egyptians would pay much attention in present circumstances. On balance, therefore, we do not think that the present is an opportune time for warnings to the Arab Governments, the Jordan and Lebanese Governments possibly excepted. Less than three months have elapsed since the UNRWA plan was approved by the General Assembly, and there is much to be said for giving Blandford a chance to play his own hand.

II. There would clearly be no objection to our talking to the Americans, in, say, three months' time with a view to concerting action at the next General Assembly. We doubt, however, whether a decision at the next assembly (even if it could be secured is put a term to relief would advance matters. In the case of Syria the difficulty is that, as you know, there are only about 80,000 refugees, most of them already half integrated, in the country; and the Syrian Government can well afford to ignore the cutting off of supplies. The only result would be that any chance of co-operation between the Syrian Government and UNRWA and of the resettlement in Syria of refugees now in Jordan, Gaza and Lebanon would be lost. Unfortunately, they cannot be resettled anywhere else; and the plain fact is that in this matter we are almost entirely at the mercy of the Syrians, who are the least affected by the problem. Egypt also could afford to ignore the sanction. The Egyptian Government is financially in a position to support the 200,000 refugees in Gaza; in the last resort they could, with little harm to themselves, let them starve. This leaves Lebanon and Jordan. In both these countries the refugees, who represent one-tenth and one-third of the population respectively, constitute a serious threat to the existing regimes. Neither Government, at least not the Jordan Government, has the means to support them. The sanction of cutting off supplies would therefore be very serious. In view of the limited resettlement possibilities in both countries, however, the result would not be the desired one. At the end of the five-year period of diminishing relief the bulk of the refugees there would still not be self-supporting. A few would no doubt find means of subsistence in Jordan and some would infiltrate and pick up jobs in Syria and Iraq. But until the tempo of economic activity in these countries particularly Syria is greatly increased the number that can be absorbed is bound to be small. The refugees in Jordan (and Lebanon) would therefore have to be maintained from outside sources. The

/alternative

alternative would be to let them starve and risk the threat to internal security. The Jordan Security Forces may be so effective that the situation could be held. We doubt, however, whether Her Majesty's Government could accept responsibility for such a situation before Parliament and world public opinion.

5. This does not mean that we are at all happy about the present situation or the outlook. Supporting action, which in the case of need might be developed into an alternative to the three-year plan, is certainly necessary. The plan itself in fact assumed that resettlement projects would be paralleled by large-scale development projects financed by local governments, the International Bank and friendly governments. This important aspect of the plan is often forgotten and unless provision is made for it, the plan will probably fail or be only very partially successful.

6. It must be recognised that the key to the solution of the problem lies in Syria, where nearly 1 million acres of new irrigated land could be brought into cultivation by development. Such development would create a demand for labour which could not be satisfied from within the country and would lead to the absorption of refugees unobtrusively and without raising political difficulties. What is required, in fact, is the reversal of the pre-war process when, as you know, great economic activity in Mandatory Palestine attracted labour from the surrounding countries. At this stage the gradual cutting off relief supplies would certainly be indicated.

7. Unfortunately, apart from the difficulty of making the necessary finance available, there is the problem of inducing the present military rulers of Syria to accept it. As Montagu-Pollock has repeatedly pointed out, Syrian co-operation can probably only be bought at the price of military equipment for the Syrian Army, and this gets us into very deep water, as you well know.

8. I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours and to Knight at Beirut.

(J. Bowker)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/17

FROM

Chancery, BMEO ~~to~~ Mr Ross.

No. (119/3/9.)

Dated

Received in Registry— 4.4.52. 8.4.52.

Refugees in the Gaza strip.

Encloses copy of a questionnaire regarding the accommodation for British forces in Gaza & discusses what effect it would have on the refugees.

(Add. to Mr Creswell, Cairo, from Sir T. Rapp.)

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) McFarlane Davies, M/Def. (6c.) 26 apl.

(Action completed) [signature] 30/4

(Index) [signature] 5/5/54

MINUTES

There is much useful information in this report. As indicated on another paper, the Syrian attitude towards refugee resettlement is slightly more cooperative than Sir T. Rapp suggests.

African Dept. (M. Bendall) [signature] 16/4

Eastern Dept. [signature]

May 6 Copies go to Mr McFarlane Davies (M/Def)

Please?

Remy Young 18/4

Copy as requested.

E Dept [signature] [signature] 28.4.52.

CW 22/4

CW 30/4

39984

SECRET

[redacted]/3/9

British Middle East Office,

G.H.Q., M.E.L.F. 17.

4th April, 1952.

When I was recently in Beirut I approached Major General Collings, Head of the U.N.R.W.A.P. Supply Organisation, and Mr. A.N.R. Montague, the Chief Engineer, for information regarding the present position in the Gaza strip on the lines of a questionnaire that had been supplied me by Major General Humphreys. The purpose was to supplement information already available at this Headquarters so that a correct appreciation of the position in the Gaza Zone could be made regarding the accommodation for British forces.

2. I think you will be interested to have a copy both of the questionnaire and of the reply as the latter forms the basis of 653 CCL of April 2nd. I gave my assurance to both Collings and Montague that their names should not appear in connection with the information, so as not to embarrass them in their relations with U.N.R.W.A.P., but I think it right that you should know that this information has been obtained from the best available sources, both persons having had an intimate connexion with the problems of the Gaza strip for a considerable period.

3. If the contention of the CCL is right that the bulk of the refugees cannot be accommodated in the area side by side with the troops, there remains the question of what is to be done with them. The only country that has the potential capacity to absorb them is Syria (if one excludes Iraq as one has to) but there is no reason that I know to think that she would be willing to accept them. Her attitude towards the resettlement of refugees is almost entirely negative, even as regards the comparatively small number that she herself harbours. In any case if she could be prevailed upon to modify her general attitude I think that the first refugees from outside to benefit would be those at present in the Lebanon, which is strongly pressing Syria to relieve her of some 80,000 of the 120,000 in her borders. Nor can I think that Egypt with her political and population problems could offer any help as part of a settlement with us. In fact, I cannot see that there is any hope of finding a suitable home for the unfortunate Gaza refugees and they are likely to be left there as derelicts living on the charity of U.N.O. for an indefinite time.

EE 1826/17

4. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Allen and Ross.

(T.C. Rapp).

E.J. Creswell Esq.,
British Embassy,
Cairo.

Enclosure in 119/3/9

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR U.N.R.W.A.P.R. REPRESENTATIVE - GAZA

1. What is the existing condition of

(a) Permanent buildings

(b) Camp and semi-permanent structures

(c) Store-houses and installations

(d) Public utilities i.e. power-houses, water supply, pumping and distribution system etc.

Which exist in the areas at present occupied by Palestinian refugees?

2. What is the daily availability of water from all sources in the area, after allowing for the requirements of the permanent population, including location of supplies and degree of salinity?

3. What constructional materials are available - either locally or from imported stocks - e.g.

(a) Stone

(b) Bricks

(c) Lime

(d) Gypsum

(e) Sand

(f) Shingle or Gravel

4. What is the type and state of repair of roads in the area ?

5. What is the present condition of the GAZA aerodrome and what types of aircraft can use it ? Are there any other airfields or airstrips in the area which are usable ?

6. What are the general rates of skilled and unskilled wages in the area ? Do these rates apply also to refugees or do they accept lower rates ?

7. What is the general standard of proficiency of refugees classified as belonging to the building and associated trades (vide UNRWAPR Statistical Bulletin - GAZA) ?

8. What percentage of foodstocks for the refugees has to be imported, and what hospital facilities are available for them ?

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE - GAZA (UNDATED)

1.(a) Permanent Buildings.

For the most part undamaged.

1.(b) Camps and semi-permanent structures.

Erected during the war (except those referred to in 1(c)) have largely disappeared.

1.(c) Storehouses and installations.

The extensive store sheds and other ex-British Army buildings at Rafah are in a reasonable condition and easily repairable. Most of them are in use by the Egyptian Army or UNRWA as supply and stores depots, workshops, etc. The Iraq Petroleum Company have a small rail served installation with some overhead storage tanks which are intact and in use.

1.(d)

Insofar as such installations exist, they are functioning. See also para. 2 below.

Permanent buildings, camps and semi-permanent structures, storehouses and other installations are, however, occupied to capacity by the Agency for refugees or for Agency services, or by the Egyptian Army.

2. There are eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip:

	Pop.	No. Wells	Quantity M³/hour	Litres per person
Rafah	23,000	2	250	10
Deir el Belah	20,000	4	260	13
Khan Yunis	53,300	Muni. well	265	5
Maghazi	6,300	1	100	16
Nuseirat	11,000	3	320	27
Breij	11,000	1	210	18
Jabalia	5,700	2	190	38
Gaza Town Camps and refugees in private dwellings	70,000	Gaza Muni. wells (4)	1,190	17
TOTALS	200,000	18	2,785	

These are watered by eighteen wells of capacity 2,785 M3 per hour, this yields a discharge equivalent to five litres per person per day from the worst well, up to thirty-eight litres per person per day in the only good well, averaging eighteen litres per person per day.

The fresh water supply in the Gaza Strip consists of a shallow fresh water table resting on the salt water infiltration from the sea. Generally speaking, therefore, pumping from this water table is strictly limited.

The salinity of the so-called fresh water wells varies from 300 to 800 parts per million. If these wells are over pumped, the salinity jumps to 4,000 and above.

3.(a)

There is a strictly limited quantity of sand stone available which can be quarried from isolated outcrops. Other stones can be obtained from rocks on the sea shore.

3.(b)

Mud-bricks are mainly made. Burnt bricks can only be manufactured by importing fuel.

3.(c)

Lime is almost unobtainable. It is understood that a certain small quantity was secured by burning the stones obtained from the soleing of abandoned roads.

3.(d)

Gypsum is not found in this area.

3.(e)

There is unlimited sand.

3.(f)

Shingle or gravel can be obtained from the bed of the Wadi Gaza. It will require screening. There is no information as to the quantity but it may be taken as practically unlimited.

4. The only road in this area which is maintained in a state of reasonable repair for all weather traffic is the main coast road. Others are unmetalled tracks in variable states of disrepair.

No record exists which is immediately available as to the design and material of this road. Careful enquiry indicates that within the old Mandate area the road is soled and the wearing coat is tarmacadam. Beyond the Mandate area the road is believed to be mix-in-place.

5. The airfield consists of a single runway of rolled earth, unsurfaced. The only aircraft which uses it regularly is the United Nations Dakota which has no difficulty landing or taking off with full load except after heavy rain when it may be out of action for anything up to three days, or when a very violent cross wind is blowing. It should be noted that the airfield adjoins the Israeli frontier which is less than one hundred yards distant from the runway, and in certain states of wind, the aircraft has to circle over Israeli territory before its run in.

There are no other air strips in the Gaza Strip but there is an Egyptian Military Airfield at El Arish with one tarmac runway, and it is known that three other aerodromes are under construction in Sinai of which no details are available.

6. It is quite impossible to reply to this question. The enormous proportion of refugees has completely upset the labour market. So long as they are drawing rations the more energetic refugees, both skilled and unskilled, will accept a few piastres per hour for any class of work. Their long idleness has rendered most tradesmen slow and unskilful but most trades are represented among the refugees. Careful enquiry indicates that prior to the advent of the refugees, the general wages scale was ten to fifteen percent below corresponding wages in the Delta.

7. The proficiency of course varies enormously from poor to good but all tradespeople are probably less efficient now than they were two years ago.

8. All food for refugees is imported by United Nations.

The Church Missionary Society Hospital, which is subsidised by United Nations has 92 beds. There are in addition:

Red Crescent	50	"
Govt. National	90	"
" Isolation Fever	60	"
" TB Bureij	100	"
EB Colony Bureij	140	"
	532	"

9.(a) Additional Information.

Attention is invited to El Arish, a small town of a few thousand inhabitants, through which the single track railway from the Delta to Gaza passes. There is a Military Aerodrome here and three others are under construction in Sinai proper. Water could be obtained from the dam at El Daiga, a distance of sixty kilometres in a straight line. There are no physical obstacles to the construction of a pipeline. The area available for encampments is unlimited.

9.(b) The railway from Egypt is running normally with three or four trains a week in each direction. The small sidings at Gaza, Rafah and El Arish are all in use.

9.(c) Gaza Port is practically non-existent, the small jetty built during the war is damaged and unusable. During the troubles in the Canal Zone, United Nations fed their refugees partly by schooners and small steamers which unloaded at Gaza beach in fine weather. There are some thirty or forty small lighters all of which have to be pulled up the beach when the sea gets in the least bit rough.

At El Arish there are no shipping facilities of any sort other than fisherman's boats.

9.(d) There are no amenities of any sort or kind in Gaza and the neighbouring villages, except the occasional Arabic cinema and cafe. In El Arish the only amenities are those provided by the military for Egyptian troops.

It should be borne in mind that this small Gaza Strip which in normal times has a population not exceeding 75,000, now houses something not far short of 300,000 and there is intense overcrowding and congestion everywhere.

A small sketch map is appended.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/18

FROM

Mr Montague Pollock
Damascus
to Sir J. Bowker.

No. (18202/33/52)

Dated

Received in Registry— 7.4.52. 16.4.52.

Resettlement in Syria

Following a talk with Brigadier Silo, Mr Blandford is more optimistic on the resettlement of Refugees in Syria.

Copied/ Amman, W'ra, Fayid

REFERENCES

-/15

MINUTES

M. Wardrop

21/4

See minute on -/19.

22/4.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
23/4	28/4

39213

E E1826/18

CONFIDENTIAL.

18202/33/52

British Legation,
Damascus.

7th April, 1952.

Dear Jim,

I am writing to confirm that I am in general agreement with the views and proposed solution set out in Furlonge's letter to you of the 31st March about the Palestine refugee problem. EE1826/15.

2. As a result of Blandford's latest talk with Brigadier Silo he is more optimistic than ever and even other usually less cheerful people are cautiously hopeful: but all this is about settling those refugees who are in Syria now. I have no grounds for believing that Silo is even thinking of taking any refugees at all from elsewhere, let alone half a million.

3. On the other hand, I must confess to fearing that the abandonment by the West of responsibility for the refugees will arouse bitter feelings in the Arab world, which will have their effect on many aspects of Anglo-Syrian relations. However, I am impressed with the necessity of settling a problem that is a constant source of friction as it is, and should be prepared to accept the risk of a serious outcry in order to be rid of the matter. We should at least be able to score a debating point by pointing out to Shishakli that we are helping him to rid Syria of one more foreign organization.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Furlonge, Franks and Rapp.

Yours ever,

Bill Bullock

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/19

FROM

Mr Furlonge
Amman
To Mr J. Bowker.

No. 18204/7

Dated

Received in Registry— 7. 4. 52.
16. 4. 52

U.N. policy re Arab refugees.

He has discussed the question – greater detail with the U.S. Chargé d'affaires, and also with his French & Turkish colleagues. Discusses Arab Govt's control of UNRWA.

Copied to Fayid.

References

EE1826/15

MINUTES

M. Vaughan. 21/4

This has now been overtaken by the news that the Syrians may be willing to take 500 000 refugees from the Arab territories.

22/4

(Print)

(How disposed of)

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(Action completed)	(Index)
5/5/4	6.5.54

40429

18204/7

British Legation,
Amman.

CONFIDENTIAL

7th April 1952.

E 1826/19

LE 1826/15

My dear Jim,

Since sending you my letter No. 18204/4 of March 31st about Arab refugee policy, I have discussed the question in greater detail with the U.S. Charge d'Affaires (he is very sensible) and, in much more general terms, with my French and Turkish colleagues and one or two other people whose views are worth having. I have been struck with the strength of the general agreement with my main thesis, namely that progress towards a solution of the problem cannot be expected unless and until the Arab Governments are saddled with the responsibility.

2. Both my French and U.S. colleagues volunteered an endorsement of my opinion that Blandford's wishful thinking constitutes a real danger. My French colleague is particularly disturbed at Blandford's acceptance of the Jordan Government's request for the removal of General Galloway, the UNRWA representative in Jordan, for the same reasons as I have already voiced in my telegrams on the subject. This is, of course, a seperate question, but the emergence of a situation in which the Arab Governments are allowed to control the UNRWA, for which we and the Americans mainly pay, seems to me to provide an additional reason for working towards a course of action on some such lines as I have suggested.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Rapp.

Yours ever,

G.W. Furlonge

(G.W.Furlonge)

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
The Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

PME

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

1952

E E1826/20

Sir H. Knight,
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

AC.100.

15.4.52.
21.4.52.

U.N. Policy.

Attaches copy of a note on talks at Damascus & Amman on 20th & 21st March, on refugee policy & UNRWA

Copied) Amman, Damascus, BMEO, N'Yor.

Last Paper

References

-/16

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 25/4

(Index) 12/6

Next Paper

(Minutes)

I agree with Sir H Knight that, if there is to be a show-down, the question of timing is all-important. This is one of the main points in Sir J. Bowker's recent letter to Mr Furlonge. The other points made in the letter to Mr Furlonge are 1) It is not yet certain that a show-down is necessary (The latest indications from Damascus are that it may not be). 2) A show-down would not advance matters.

Eastern Dept. 23/4

I think a show-down would be very dangerous. If there is to be a competition in doing nothing between the Adcom. Powers and the Arabs, the Arabs would win every time! In the meantime the Refugees themselves might not starve quietly and produce a situation likely to benefit nobody but the Russians. Syria shows signs of playing and it should not be impossible to induce Jordan to do what they can. The chief difficulty there is lack of cash combined with administrative incompetance in an advanced degree.

Christopher Phillips
24.5.52.

34092

1/24/4

Secret

Beirut.

15/4/52.

(AC100)

E 1826/20

My dear Evans.

I have just this instant got from the MES under EE 1826/16 a copy of Furlonge's 18204 of 31.3.52. and have no chance of sending you any comments by thisweeks bag. But I find I have copies of a note which I put down for my own use last month which as it was written after talking with Furlonge Samuel (Montagu Pollock was out) Golloway and others may have relevance.

You will see that I largely agree with Furlonge but differ from him on the question of timing of the inevitable show-down.

I decided not to send the note at the time as there are other considerations (e.g having a Russian member on the Adcom if we get out of agreement with the Aarbs!;) which I think need to be discussed, and in particular I want to dis cuss with Locke after he has returned and had a chance to size up the then situation, which is why I want to return from leave soon after July instead of later.

I amsending copies of this to Furlonge, and Montague Pollock, though I had talked over things with the latter last week, and to Rapp.

To Franks

yours sincerely

H Taylor.

SECRET

REFUGEE POLICY AND U.N.R.W.A.

Talks at Damascus and Amman March, 1952

Refugees in Syria cannot now be considered for settlement on State land until all the Syrian applicants have been considered and approved or rejected. Probably this means no refugee can be considered for two or three years. Possible Syria might wink at private owners taking refugees on private land, but large-scale refugee resettlement seems very distant.

It is arguable that Arab Governments have no real intention of helping reintegration of refugees which would involve making up their minds, facing possible opposition and public opinion, a disturbance and strengthening of their normal administrative services and departure from their political line against Israel. So long as relief is given to refugees by U.N., there is no real reason why the Arab Governments should bother about reintegration and they will continue to lead the Western Powers up the garden path by promising help under the belief that the Western Powers will never stop relief to the refugees.

UNRWA does not yet appreciate that the promises of Arab Governments are merely polite gestures and not effective action.

There will be no reintegration of refugees until the Arab Governments receive the shock of finding that the Western Powers are not going to go on paying for relief unless the Arab Governments show reintegration progress.

This shock must be given some day. The question is - when?

Should UNRWA Adcom. report at the next General Assembly adopt this view, and advise the United Nations that reintegration by outside agency should be stopped and that to obtain reintegration at all United Nations relief expenditure must (a) be in form of cash to Arab Governments and (b) in diminishing amounts, Such a report would need marshalling evidence that reintegration is making no progress and prior consultation with Adcom. Governments as to policy of making such a report, It would be useless and unwise for Adcom. to make such report if its Governments were not prepared to back it.

Time would have to be given to consult Adcom. Governments and for Adcom. Governments to agree among themselves on a joint policy. Adcom. report to be ready by the Middle of October. This would probably mean consulting Adcom. Governments at latest about the beginning of September.

Adcom. Governments would have to consider various questions of policy which are without purview of Adcom; for instance:

Defence of the Middle East and whether action regarding refugees unacceptable to Arab Governments will affect defence problem.

Arab States, plus the Asiatic bloc, plus South American bloc, have a large majority in the United Nations and action regarding refugees unacceptable to Arab States might perhaps affect their voting on entirely different matters, and they might have support of other nations.

A resolution proposing to stop reintegration by United Nations, and to hand over funds for relief to Arab Governments on a diminishing scale, might be rejected by United Nations as contrary to humanity.

It also might be rejected opposed by the Arab States as denying

/their

their pet thesis that United Nations are entirely responsible for looking after the refugees.

It is possible that then the Arab States, in consistence with their thesis, would refuse to accept the money with which they were to administer relief to refugees and prefer to let the refugees starve. Furlonge does not think that any Arab State would let the refugees starve. I am not so sure of this in view of their attitude at Paris and denial of any responsibility for the refugees.

If the Arab States did so refuse, would the Adcom. Powers and the other United Nations stick to their decision and let the refugees starve?

Alternatively, the Arab States and their friends might propose a resolution for the continuance of relief and reintegration at United Nations' cost. Would Adcom. countries be willing to refuse to contribute to reintegration and refuse to contribute to relief unless administered by Arab Governments, and thus leave the Arab Governments with the responsibility of inducing the miscellaneous United Nations countries to provide funds on a scale they have never been willing to hitherto: probably 25-30 million dollars a year. It is most unlikely that funds will be thus raised.

AS

SECRET

As regards the individual countries and the stoppage of relief and reintegration.

Syria can undoubtedly absorb its 80,000 refugees without trouble. Lebanon would be frightened lest the 130,000 refugees turned its Christian majority into a minority. Already signs of Moslem idea of this. Egypt can well afford the 200,000 Gaza refugees. (to feed)

Jordan is the difficulty. No possibility of increasing Jordan economic strength to the viable. Absorption of 4,500,000 persons. Unless the Arab World bring pressure on Syria, and on the refugees, trouble seems inevitable in Jordan.

The administration of relief with funds provided by United Nations would stretch Jordan's administrative services to the utmost and to deal with the refugees without relief from the United Nations or other sources would (a) probably break down the administrative machine altogether and (b) lead to violence in the refugees. Jordan is now under a democratic constitution with a vocal and politically-minded Palestinian element in the Parliament. The effect of the Arab Legion suppressing the refugees might lead to attempt to form a strongly-left Government, and whether the King with the Arab Legion could suppress this, I do not know. Furlonge thinks that the Arab Legion could preserve order, as the Palestinian Arab is at best poor stuff and now more apathetic than ever. What effect on Jordan HMG relations would be, I do not know.

The whole matter would have to be considered in connection with the U.S.A. Point IV and other plans, and U.S.A. idealism plus anxiety to extend U.S.A. business influence, plus USA fear of Communism.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/21

Mr Bromley, Baghdad. to Mr Evans. 1822/36/52. 23.4.52. 25.4.52.

Resettlement - Iraq.

Nuri Pasha's views on resettlement of refugees - Iraq. It is unlikely that the Iraq Govt will make any proposals at present.

(Copied) Amman, Sir H. Knight, Beirut.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Letter is for H Knight.

28/4

References

-/12
13

E 1028/4

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(1) Sir H. Knight, Beirut from Mr Evans. 1 May.

16) Mr Myers, Beirut. 13 June.

(Action completed) 1/6

(Index) 17/5.

Next Paper

34092

CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy,

BAGDAD

(1822/36/52)

23rd April, 1952

E 1826/21

Dear Evans,

Please refer to your letter No. EE 1826/12 of the 28th March about the refugee problem.

2. When the Ambassador saw Nuri Pasha on the 20th April he told him of the Foreign Secretary's interest in this question and asked if Nuri had given any thought to the subject himself. Nuri replied that there was at present no land available in Iraq for refugees, but there was no objection on his side to people such as carpenters, etc., coming here and taking work. In fact, he added, some were here already and were being employed by the oil companies. Nuri concluded that his belief was that the refugees did not want to come to Iraq in large numbers.

3. We do not think that Nuri or any other responsible politician in Iraq would be willing to say even as little as this in public. In general, Iraqis are not interested in the refugees and few politicians would be willing, particularly in this election year, to risk their political fortunes by issuing a statement on the refugee problem just to please us, or the Syrians or Jordanians, unless they were to derive some substantial benefit from it. Incidentally, we had interpreted Taufiq Abdul Huda's suggestion reported in paragraph 2 of Amman telegram No. 105 as another dig at the Iraqis.

E 1028/4

4. In the circumstances we think that the procedure suggested in Sir H. Knight's letter No. AC 100/5 of the 19th March to Blandford offers the best hope of settling refugees in Iraq for the time being. In a couple of years the labour shortage may be such that this procedure can be extended from skilled to unskilled labour.

5. I should perhaps add that we did realise that Jamali and Shakir al Wadi were rabid on the subject of Palestine. But the Ambassador thought that it would only be polite to take Sir H. Knight, who stayed at the Embassy, to call on Shakir al Wadi who is Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. The visit to Jamali was arranged at the request of Sir Henry who had seen something of Jamali during the General Assembly's meetings at Paris. We thought it best otherwise that Count Knuth, the U.N.R.W.A. representative in Bagdad, should look after Sir Henry and we understand from Count Knuth that Sir Henry expressed a desire to see on this occasion various projects rather than personalities.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir H. Knight and to the Chancery at Amman.

Yours ever,

Tom Bromley

(T.E. BROMLEY)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

120

Registry No. EE 1826/21

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Sir H Knight
K.S.C.I., C.I.E
Beirut

from

T.E. EVANS

Henry

OUTFILE

+OC.

I should be glad if you would let me have a copy of your letter No. A.C. 100/5 of the 19th March to Blandford.

It is referred to in Bromley's Bagdad letter 1822/36/52 of the 23rd April.

[illegible] 28/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
29 APR 1952
SENT TO TYPE 30/4
DESPATCHED

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

1st May, 1952

(EE 1826/21)

CONFIDENTIAL

I should be glad if you would let me have a copy of your letter No. A.C. 100/5 of the 19th March to Blandford.

2. It is referred to in Bromley's Bagdad letter 1822/36/52 of the 23rd April.

(T.E. Evans)

Sir Henry Knight K.S.C.I., C.I.E.,
Beirut.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

1952

E E 1826/22

FROM

Mr Chapman Andrews

No. Beirut.

Dated 231.

Received in Registry— 25.4.52. 28.4.52.

REFERENCES

ET1421/5.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Tel) Beirut 338 1 May.

Rpt) Amman 174
Damascus 194
Tel Aviv 162.
W. Von 912(1) (1/5)

(Action completed) [signature] 1/5

(Index) [signature] 12/5.

Resettlement in Jordan.

Embodies text of a telegram from the State Dept stating that because the development of the Jordan Valley is so important to refugees, UNRWA should take the initiative in obtaining technical & legal information.

Rpt) W. Von. Damascus. Amman. Tel Aviv.

MINUTES

Pl see -/23 [Flag C] and draft tel which is self explanatory.

Eastern Dept. [signature] 1/5

I agree that an attempt by U.N.R.W.A. to carry this out would be fatal. We should try and ensure that Israel accepts the Jordan compromise. I agree with the draft.

Christopher Jim Cordon 1.5.52.

Tel issued. [signature] 1/5

See within

A/ Washington 486(1) of 9/5/52.

Mr Pirie-Gordon

[signature] 8/6

P Watalow 5/6 (just received)

[signature] 10/6

39984

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 1826/22

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Chapman Andrews
No. 231
25th April, 1952

D. 9.05 a.m. 26th April, 1952
R.10.50 a.m. 26th April, 1952

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 231 of 25th April
Repeated for information to Washington Amman
Damascus Tel Aviv.

Following from Knight.

Bergus has received following telegram from State Department which it is desired to discuss at the Advisory Commission meeting on 2nd May.

[Begins].

It is considered by the Department of State that the development of the Jordan River Valley at the earliest possible date would be highly desireable. This development would permit substantial number of Palestine refugees to be resettled in Jordan. Furthermore it would strengthen the economic structures of the riparian States, with benefits to the political stability of the entire area. The MacDonald report to Jordan Government and the Hayes-Savage and subsequent reports to Governments of Palestine and Israel indicate the feasibility of large scale developments provided that a solution to political problems involved could be obtained and the affected States could actively cooperate.

To permit determination of measures necessary to achieve this objective, the Department believes that essential preliminary steps would be the preparation of detailed engineering and legal studies of the Jordan water system by impartial technicians in the light of present facts. Such studies should include:

(i) tabulation of existing concessions in the area affecting water usage.

(ii) comparison and analysis of development proposals already made.

(iii) discussion of water rights of the riparian States

/and .....

and

(iv) recommendations for resolving the conflict of interests in the light of technical possibilities. These recommendations might go so far as to include the suggestion to look towards the creation of an international body representing the riparian States. This body could be charged with the responsibility for seeking the necessary [grp. undec.] programme and settlement of problems that arise from its execution.

3. In view of the importance of Jordan Valley development to refugee resettlement, and the fact that the Agency's funds might well be used in this development, the Department believes that UNRWA is the agency to take the initiative in obtaining necessary technical and legal information. The United States Delegation to the Advisory Commission is therefore requested to urge the Agency to consider appointment of a special representative with broad fact-finding responsibilities regarding the Jordan Valley. This representative would contract with individuals and firms to prepare the necessary studies based on available data and would also assemble final report.

[Ends].

2. Bergus is telegraphing to find out if the 3rd paragraph implies that UNRWA should take the initiative in approaching Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Jordan Governments. Probably the Director at the present stage of negotiations with Syria and Jordan will oppose UNRWA doing this. The suggestion in paragraph 4 of my letter AC41 of 5th March [? grp. omitted] that the Diplomatic Missions in the countries concerned should make preliminary soundings. Seemingly A.N.K. Director may also oppose the appointment of a special representative for the task, as item 4 of the 2nd paragraph might have some political aspects. It seems [grp. undec.] preferable UNRWA should employ a suitable firm to make the necessary study and assemble final report.

ET 1421/5

4. Presumably in view of the developments in Israel [grp. undec.] area the proposal already made would have to be brought up to date by investigations in the field.

5. May I have any necessary instructions before the 2nd May.

Foreign Office pass Washington and Tel Aviv as my telegrams No. 3 and 31 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Tel Aviv].

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Eastern Dept., Middle East Secretariat, United Nations (Economic and Social) Dept.

566

[Mr Evans.]

Registry No. EE 1826/22

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

CYPHER

F.O.

OUTFILE

1. 5. 1952.

Despatched 6.40 P.M.

Draft.
BEIRUT

Telegram.
No. 338
(Date) 1/5/52.

Repeat to :—
AMMAN 194
DAMASCUS 194
TELAVIV 162

and
SAVING to
WASHINGTON.
1912 Sav

Eastern Dept.
1/5

~~En Clair.~~ [Flag A]
~~Code.~~
Cypher. [Flag B]
and By Bag.

Distribution :—
DEPARTMENTAL.
Eastern Dept. [Flag C]
Middle East Secretariat.
United Nations Ec. and Soc.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
2 MAY 1952
MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

Copies to :—

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Beirut telegram No. 338 of 1/5/52 repeated for information to Amman, Damascus and Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington.

Your telegram No. 231 [of 25th April : Jordan Valley Development].

Following for Knight.

Although we agree with the State Department that the earliest possible development of the Jordan Valley is highly desirable and that an independent study is necessary, we consider that it would be most unwise for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the present stage of its negotiations in Syria, to take the initiative on a subject involving such delicate political issues. In any case, the Agency's intervention is unlikely to be acceptable to Jordan or to Israel - please see Amman telegram No. 8 Saving [of the 7th April] and Telaviv telegram No. 35 Saving of the 4th September.

2. As you will have seen from Amman telegram No. 159 [of the 28th April] The Jordan Prime Minister is considering, in connexion with the more limited problem of the salination of Jordan waters, the possibility that a joint technical Sub Committee might be appointed by the ~~Mixed~~ Mixed Armistice Commission. ~~M. A. C.~~ This seems a very fair compromise between the thesis held in the past by Jordan, that the dispute should be considered by the M. A. C. and that held by Israel that the

/M. A. C. is in no ...

31 Spir
1/5/52
Ma.

(13556) Wt. 43697-140 100m 3/47 G.S.St. Gp 620

M.A.C. is in no way involved and that the dispute should be the subject of direct negotiation. The Sub Committee would hardly be able to avoid considering the wider problem of the control of Jordan waters as a whole and this might well lead to a recommendation in favour of an independent survey. The possibility of the International Bank accepting such an assignment should not be ruled out. Tel Aviv letter No. 14201/2/52 of the 4th March indicates that an arrangement involving the International Bank might be acceptable to Israel.

[Freq DJ

3. At the meeting of the Advisory Commission on the 2nd May you should therefore urge that the Agency should not repeat not take the initiative in this matter, at least for the present.

Distributed to
Eastern Dept
Middle East Secretariat
United Nations Economic and Social Dept

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BEIRUT

Cyph[illegible]/OTP and
By Bag
EE 1826/22

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 338
1st May, 1952.

D. 6.40 p.m. 1st May, 1952.

PRIORITY.
CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Beirut telegram No. 338 of 1st May, 1952.
Repeated for information to Amman
Damascus
Tel Aviv and Saving to
Washington No. 1912.

Your telegram No. 231 [of 25th April: Jordan Valley Development].

Following for Knight.

Although we agree with the State Department that the earliest possible development of the Jordan Valley is highly desirable and that an independent study is necessary, we consider that it would be most unwise for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the present stage of its negotiations in Syria, to take the initiative on a subject involving such delicate political issues. In any case, the Agency's intervention is unlikely to be acceptable to Jordan or to Israel - please see Amman telegram No. 8 Saving [of 7th April] and Tel Aviv telegram No. 35 Saving of 4th September.

2. As you will have seen from Amman telegram No. 159 [of 28th April] the Jordan Prime Minister is considering, in connexion with the more limited problem of the salination of Jordan waters, the possibility that a joint technical Sub Committee might be appointed by the Mixed Armistice Commission. This seems a very fair compromise between the thesis held in the past by Jordan, that the dispute should be considered by the Mixed Armistice Commission and that held by Israel that the Mixed Armistice Commission is in no way involved and that the dispute should be the subject of direct negotiation. The Sub Committee would hardly be able to avoid considering the wider problem of the control of Jordan waters as a whole and this might well lead to a recommendation in favour of an independent survey. The possibility of the International Bank accepting such an assignment should not be

/ruled

ruled out. Tel Aviv letter No. 14201/2/52 of 4th March indicates that an arrangement involving the International Bank might be acceptable to Israel.

3. At the meeting of the Advisory Commission on 2nd May you should therefore urge that the Agency should not repeat not take the initiative in this matter, at least for the present.

DISTRIBUTED TO

Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat
United Nations Economic and Social Department

CCCCC

INWARD TELEGRAM

E

EE 1826/22A.

ENCLAIR (BY BAG)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

NO. 486 SAVING
9th May, 1952.

D. 8.30 a.m. 10th May, 1952.

CB

ADVANCE COPY

(Depart! Distr).

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office
telegram No. 486 Saving of 9th May, 1952.
Repeated for information Saving to -

Beirut (for Knight)	No. 26
Amman	No. 23
Damascus	No. 27
Tel Aviv	No. 22

EF 1826/22

Your telegram No. 338 /of May 1st/ to Beirut.

JORDAN VALLEY DEVELOPMENT.

The gist of your telegram under reference was given to the State Department, who were impressed by the reasoning. After due consideration they have now said that they have no strong feelings about what organisation should assume responsibility for the survey and are content to leave it to the recommendations of their representatives on the spot, whom they will be consulting.

FRANKS

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/23

FROM

Mr Furlonge

Amman.

No. 159.

Dated 28-4-52.

Received in Registry— 29-4-52.

REFERENCES

EE 1826/22

ET 1422/1

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

Resettlement in Jordan.

Record of a meeting with the U.S. Minister and Mr Blandford of UNRWA. It was agreed that the full consent of the Jordan, and Israel Govts was required, before UNRWA could undertake a survey of Jordan Valley.

Rpt W. Van Damascus, Tel Aviv, Beirut.

MINUTES

The Jordan P.M.'s idea of a Technical Sub Committee appointed by the Mixed Armistice Committee occurred to us several months ago — pl see Mr Oliver's minute of the 15th Sept on ET 1424/45 of 1951. [Flag A]

Pl see draft tel on -/22

Eastern Dept.

1/5

This seems a most reasonable compromise. As the idea originated in the Dept. Some months ago it is possible that the Jordan P.M. did not think of it all by himself! I think this should be acceptable to Israel and if they make further difficulties we should put some pressure on them. ~~to accept~~

Christopher Pirie Gordon

1.5.52.

1/5

39984

E 1826/23

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Furlonge
No. 159
28th April, 1952.

D: 5.36 p.m. 28th April, 1952.
R: 7.41 p.m. 28th April, 1952.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 159 of 28th April,
Repeated for information to Washington
and Saving to Damascus Beirut.
Tel Aviv

Beirut telegram 231. E 1826/22

My United States colleague raised this matter with me and we discussed it with Blandford yesterday.

We expressed the view that item (iv) in paragraph 3 of State Department telegram could hardly fail to raise political issues on which Jordan opinion feels strongly, so that already difficult position of UNRWA in this country might be adversely affected if it were to undertake the proposed survey. Blandford, while note wholly adverse to UNRWA's doing so, agreed that it would be preferable if it could be done by some other agency e.g. a body appointed ad hoc by the Secretary General of the United Nations. He did not think that the International Bank would be likely to agree to undertake it. We all agreed that full consent of the Jordan and Israeli Governments, and preferably of Syrian and Lebanese Governments also, was an essential prerequisite.

2. The Jordan Director of Lands has told me in confidence of a meeting which he attended last week between the Jordan Minister of Defence and two Syrian officers, apparently arranged as a follow-up to conversations which took place during the visit of the Syrian head of State.

At this meeting both sides agreed that some step was required to safeguard Arab rights in the Jordan, but it was clear that the Syrians were wholly preoccupied with the strategic implications of the draining of the Huleh marshes whereas Jordan interest in the question is primarily economic. It was apparently agreed to recommend to the two Governments that the whole question should be taken up through the

/ appropriate channel, ...

29 APR 1952 AMMAN

appropriate channel, which might be the Security Council. It was, however, recognised on the Jordan side that if this were done the Syrian strategic thesis would not be likely to prevail against the Israeli economic thesis, any more than it did last autumn, and Syrian support would, therefore, not be very helpful to Jordan.

3. In view of these developments, I took advantage of a visit to the Jordan Prime Minister today to say that I had heard reports that the Jordan river was again going salt and that it looked as though this problem was likely to prove a recurrent menace to Jordan, quite apart from the importance of the Jordan Valley development for Jordan's economy and refugee resettlement. I, therefore, wished to learn whether he was considering any method of tackling it. The Prime Minister replied that he had seen a report by Mr. Walpole (my letter No. 14201/13 of 17th March to Evans: I had of course not mentioned this) and was considering raising the question under Article 9 of the Israeli-Jordan Armistice Agreement with a view to the establishment of a joint technical sub-committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

In reply to my enquiries he stated

(a) that he much preferred this method to intervention by any United Nations Agency in view of the influence which he was convinced Israel exercised in United Nations

(b) that while obliged to keep in close touch with the Syrians he did not proposed necessarily to adopt a common line with them in view of difference in interest referred to in paragraph 2 above which he recognised. He thought it better to attempt to reach a solution with the Israelis first, with which the Lebanese and Syrian Governments might be associated later. He stated, however, that he had reached no decision and promised to inform me if and when he did. I stressed the urgency and importance of the matter.

4. I have informed my United States colleague of this conversation. He appears to favour the Prime Minister's idea of proceeding under Article 8, which indeed has much to commend it.

/ Foreign Office .....

Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram No. 2 and to Tel Aviv as my Saving telegram No. 8.

[Repeated to Washington and Saving to Tel Aviv].

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat
United Nations (Economic and Social) Department
United Nations Political Department

44444

1952

PEE

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

PME

E E 1826/24

Mr Furlange
Amman
to Mr Ross.

(11411/3)

19 · 4 · 52.
28 · 4 · 52

Resettlement – Iraq.

Discusses the possibility of refugees or "economic refugees" finding jobs in Iraq & thus relieving Jordan economy.

(Add. to Sir J. Troutbeck, Bagdad)

Last Paper

References

EQ 1103/3.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

See EQ 1103/3.

(Minutes)

We have already asked Bagdad to take action on the lines ~~in para~~ suggested in para 4 within see our letter of April 26th on EQ 1103/3. We ~~are~~ ~~might~~ might copying this letter to Amman.

C Watalow
3/5

Yes

[signature] 1/5

Copy to Amman.

CW 7/5

(Action completed)

[signature]

(Index)

[signature] 12/5.

Next Paper

34092

11411/3

British Legation,
Amman.

CONFIDENTIAL

19th April 1952.

EO 1103/3.

I have read with great interest your Despatch No. 48E of March 27th to the Foreign Office reporting the progress of the Iraq Development Board. The experience gained in Iraq in the functioning of this Board may be of considerable importance to us here, where we are just on the point of setting up a somewhat simplified form of Development Board to deal with the much smaller resources available in Jordan for economic development.

2. The point of most immediate interest to us here is contained in paragraph 8 of your despatch, in which you suggest that the Iraq Government might not object to contractors transferring Palestinian refugees to Iraq to do jobs for which Iraqi labour was not available. As you know, we not only have the 450,000 Palestinian refugees but a large number of so-called "economic refugees", i.e., persons who, while still living in their original houses, have lost their means of livelihood as a direct result of the situation in Palestine. The state of many of these latter is worse than that of the refugees, as they cannot be fed by the UNRWA and have little or no other means of subsistence. The Jordan Government are rightly concerned about them and are in the process, in consultation with this Legation and the Americans, in studying plans for assisting them, but it seems unlikely that anything much can be done through sheer lack of physical resources.

3. It follows from this that any Palestinians, whether refugees or "economic refugees", who could find jobs in Iraq would relieve the Jordan economy. Amongst the "economic refugees" there are a number who would willingly go to Iraq for work if only their entry could be facilitated: I understand that the grant of visas constitutes, particularly for those in Arab Palestine, a formidable difficulty. This could presumably be got over if the contractor in Iraq arranged the matter with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

4. Unless therefore you or the Foreign Office see objection, I should hope that it might be possible to encourage contractors in Iraq who are short of labour to seek it in Jordan and particularly on the West Bank. I have no reason to suppose that the Jordan Government would not be fully cooperative.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Ross (who will no doubt wish to comment) and also to Rapp, Franks, and Sir Henry Knight in Beirut.

(G.W.Furlonge)

Sir John Troutbeck, K.C.M.G.,
Her Majesty's Ambassador,
Baghdad.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/25

FROM

F.O. Minute
(Mr Evans)

No.

Dated 16. 4. 52.

Received in Registry— 30. 4. 52.

References

-/16.
15.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

See out letter on -/16

(Action completed)	(Index)
24/5.	38/5

Resettlement of refugees.

Discusses the position regarding the resettlement in Arab States. Comments on action proposed by Mr Furlonge, Amman.

MINUTES

M. Drieforden may care to see

14/5

39984

Draft letter for bag of 19/4 attached

EE1826/16

E EE1826/25

PALESTINE REFUGEES

[Flag A]

In his letter 18204/4 of the 31st March Her Majesty's Minister, Amman analyses the present situation, reaches the conclusion that it is unsatisfactory and even dangerous and makes certain recommendations.

2. Mr. Furlonge's Analysis

(i) There is no hope of resettling in Jordan in the foreseeable future more than a fraction of the 100,000 refugees whom UNRWA proposes to resettle in that country.

(ii) There is no hope of the Syrian Government agreeing in the foreseeable future to resettle any appreciable numbers of the refugees from Jordan, Gaza and Lebanon who cannot be absorbed where they now are. UNRWA estimate that refugees who will have to be transferred prior to resettlement number about 600,000.

(iii) The vast majority of the Jordan refugees will not agree to going to Syria as long as they are fed by UNRWA.

(iv) Responsibility must primarily rest in varying measure with the Arab Governments who have failed to co-operate with UNRWA.

(v) The outlook would be much better if (which is unlikely) Israel agreed to pay full compensation.

3. Action recommended by Mr. Furlonge. Mr. Furlonge concludes that the Arab Governments and the refugees should "be given a jolt" and recommends:-

I. We and the Americans should unofficially warn the Syrian Government and possibly the other Arab Governments that if the UNRWA plan failed, we doubted whether money would be forthcoming in the following years.

II. If after, say, three months there were still no signs of Arab co-operation, we and the Americans should discuss with a view to concerting action at the next General Assembly. The action envisaged by Mr. Furlonge would be on the following lines:-

(a) Responsibility for maintaining the refugees should be handed over to the Arab Governments.

(b) The Arab Governments who needed it should be offered financial assistance for refugee maintenance on a diminishing scale for a specific period, say five years.

(c) The Arab Governments could apply for assistance for economic development to the International Bank, the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government.

4. Comments on Mr. Furlonge's Analysis.

(i) Resettlement possibilities in Jordan are undoubtedly limited, but until a real effort is made it is not possible to say how many can be absorbed there.

(ii) The outlook in Syria is more promising now than at any time. Sir Henry Knight recently reported that there were indications that the Syrians would accept refugees from Lebanon and Gaza (but apparently not from Jordan).

/The

The United States Embassy here have recently had information to the effect that on March 26th the Head of the Syrian State accepted Mr. Blandford's proposals, which would lead to the resettlement of one-third of the 80,000 refugees now in Syria. There is no mention of the acceptance of refugees from other territories, but if the offer is genuine it at least represents an essential preliminary to more far-reaching co-operation at a later stage. It is important to remember that the Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordan Governments are pressing the Syrians to co-operate.

(iii) Until the refugees are actually offered more attractive alternatives to camp life it cannot be known whether they will accept it or prefer to remain on relief. The few resettlement possibilities which have been provided in Jordan are much sought after by the refugees.

(iv) It is generally agreed that the payment of compensation by Israel would represent an important contribution to the solution of the problem.

5. Comments on action recommended by Mr. Furlonge.

I. I see no objection, in principle, to an unofficial warning to the Syrian Government on the subject of future funds. I doubt, however, whether such a warning would have much effect, particularly in the present state of Anglo-Syrian and American-Syrian relations. The Director of UNRWA and no doubt Her Majesty's Representatives in private conversation have repeatedly made this point. It should also be noted that both H.M. Minister, Damascus and Sir Henry Knight rejected a recent suggestion that Mr. Blandford should be given diplomatic support in his negotiations with the Syrian Government. As regards the other Arab Governments, a warning in Amman and possibly in Beirut might have some effect. I doubt whether the Egyptian Government would pay much attention in present circumstances. On balance I do not think that the present is an opportune time for a warning to the Arab Governments, the Jordan and Lebanese Governments possibly excepted. Less than three months have elapsed since the three-year plan was approved by the General Assembly; and Mr. Blandford should, I think, be given a chance to play his own hand.

II. There is clearly no objection to our talking to the Americans in, say, three months' time with a view to concerting action at the next General Assembly. The action which Mr. Furlonge contemplates, i.e. putting a definite term to relief, would not however advance matters. In the case of Syria the difficulty is that there are only about 80,000 refugees, most of them already half reintegrated, in the country and the Syrian Government can well afford to ignore the threat or even the actual cutting off of supplies. As far as Syria is concerned this sanction would be little more than a useless gesture. More seriously, it would fatally prejudice any chance of Syria accepting refugees from other Arab countries. Mr. Furlonge considers these chances to be nil, but he may be wrong; and in any case the refugees cannot be absorbed anywhere else. Egypt could also afford to ignore the sanction. She is financially in a position to support the 200,000 refugees in Gaza; in the last resort she could, with little harm to herself, let them starve. This leaves Lebanon and Jordan. In both these countries the refugees, who represent one-tenth and one-third of the population, constitute a serious threat to the existing regimes. Neither Government, at least not the Jordan Government, has the means to support them on relief. The sanction of cutting

/off

off supplies would therefore be very serious. The result would, however, in view of the limited resettlement possibilities in both countries, not be what we desired. At the end of the five-year period proposed by Mr. Furlonge the refugees would still not be self-supporting and would have to be maintained from outside sources. The alternative would be to let them starve and to risk the threat to internal security. Mr. Furlonge considers the Jordan Security Forces to be so effective that the situation could be held. I do not believe, however, that Her Majesty's Government would accept responsibility for such a situation before Parliament and world public opinion.

6. The conclusion is that the drastic action recommended by Mr. Furlonge would not only not do good, but might do great harm.

7. Possible alternative action. The situation is, however, far from satisfactory, and supporting action for the UNRWA three-year plan is certainly necessary. The plan itself in fact assumed that resettlement projects would be paralleled by large-scale development projects financed by local governments, the International Bank and friendly governments. This important aspect of the plan is often forgotten. Unless provision is made for it, there is no doubt, in my mind, that the plan will fail or will only be partially successful.

It should be recognised that the key to the solution of the refugee problem is Syria, where nearly 1 million acres of new irrigated land could be brought into cultivation by development. The co-operation of the Syrian Government is essential. It cannot be secured by threats, as we have no effective sanctions. It must, therefore, be won by other means. The Syrian Government contend, with good reason, that since the end of the Palestine war the Western Powers have done virtually nothing for Syria. Successive Syrian governments have asked for military equipment for the Syrian Army and for financial assistance for economic development. The response has been far from satisfying to the Syrians. To secure the full co-operation of the Syrian Government with a view to the solution of the refugee problem, there is, to my mind, no alternative to the Western Powers offering the Syrian Government:-

[Flag B]

(a) Adequate supplies of military equipment. This, as pointed out in paragraph 4 of H.M. Minister's despatch No. 46, was the first priority for the present military rulers of Syria.

(b) Financial assistance for economic development. Such development would create a demand for labour which could not be satisfied from within the country and would lead to the absorption of refugees unobtrusively and without raising political difficulties. What is required is the reversal of the pre-war process when great economic activity in Mandatory Palestine attracted labour from the surrounding countries. at this stage the

Gradual cutting off of relief supplies would certainly be indicated

8. The question of arms for Syria is being considered separately. As regards economic aid, we have for nearly two years been pressing the Treasury, without result, to consider the possibility of some United Kingdom financial aid - Mr. Morrison wrote to Mr. Gaitskell in July 1951. The Treasury are now considering the question in the light of the re-deployment of our Middle East Forces. Sir Roger Makins,

[Flags C & D]

/in

in his report on his recent Middle East tour, stated that Syria's capital requirements for economic development amounted to about £50 million.

10. Conclusions.

(i) Pending the receipt of the comments of Sir Henry Knight, an interim reply on the lines of the attached draft should be sent to Mr. Furlonge. This might prepare the way for fuller consideration of the problem at the Conference of Her Majesty's Representatives.

(ii) If there is no reply from the Treasury within, say, a fortnight on the subject of aid for economic development in Syria, the possibility of an approach by the Secretary of State to the Chancellor should be considered.

(iii) The question of arms for Syria should be further considered in the light of the effect on the refugee question.

(iv) We should continue to urge the Palestine Conciliation Commission to press ahead with the question of compensation.

(T. E. Evans)
Middle East Secretariat

16th April, 1952.

M. Ross
Sir J. Bowker

I still think that Mr. Furlonge's proposals, provided of course that the UK, the USA & France acted in concert, would offer the best prospect of settling the refugees. Is it out of the question for the funds which we now pay to finance Blandford's activities to be re-allocated to development projects in Syria on condition that that country accepts the bulk of the refugees still unsettled?

I can there is no purpose in considering the question

of

of arms for Syria further in the light of the refugee question.

Hadow Ross
18/4

I agree that, pending the receipt of Sir Henry Knight's comments, we should write to Mr. Furlonge as in the attached draft, which I have initialled for despatch by today's bag.

Our main difficulty in dealing with the refugees is that we are depending, for a solution, on the Arab country (Syria) which is the least affected by the problem. Thus it is difficult to exercise effective pressure. There has today been a development as regards the possibilities of resettlement in Syria which, on the face of it, is encouraging.

Mr. Ross's suggestion in paragraph 1 of his minute seems to have attractions.

I should be grateful if Mr. Evans would let me know (orally) of the present position about compensation.

R.G.B.

19th April, 1952

Mr. Evans ✓

The difficulty about Mr. Ross' suggestion is the condition attaching to it. If Syria were prepared to accept the bulk of the refugees, all would be well.

Fortunately since the above was drafted, the indications from Syria are,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(31059) Wt. 28233—243 250m 10/50 G.S.St.

as Sir T Brooks points out, more encouraging

I have noted the last para. of the immediately proceeding minute.

[signature] 21/4

Mr. Wardrop (may care to see)

Thank you.

James C Wardrop
21/4.

Let us hope that the latest indications from Syria will prove reliable. I was, of course, thinking of the attraction for the Syrian leaders of the prospect of a really big development scheme. I recognize that we have no other form of pressure to exercise.

R.S.M.R.
22/4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I agree that substantial assistance for a really large-scale development programme would probably have an attraction for the Syrian Government. UNRWA funds cannot, however, be used for basic development, as they are required for housing refugees, providing them with tools, equipment, animals, seed for the first year, etc. Under the £250 million programme not more than £1,300 per refugee family will be available for all these purposes. If the funds were used for building dams, irrigation schemes, drainage, etc., refugees would have to make their own arrangements for their movement to and resettlement in Syria. In view of the large numbers involved (about 500,000), the result would be chaotic, and it can be safely assumed that neither the Syrian Government nor the Governments of the Arab States where the refugees now are would agree to such a procedure. There is the further point that movement would only begin <u>after</u> development had started in Syria. It is important that the refugees should start moving as soon as possible.

It is certainly to be hoped that Colonel Shishakli will be as good as his word. I do, however, consider that certain measures should be taken now, either as supporting action for the Blandford plan or, in the case of need, as an alternative to it. This means foreign assistance for economic development in Syria and, if possible, a "sweetener" in the form of arms for the Syrian Army. I have again reminded the Treasury that on the former question the Ball is in their court. As regards arms, I fully realise the great difficulties involved. It occurs to me, however, that now that the Chiefs of Staff are directly interested in the removal to Syria of the 200,000 refugees in Gaza in connection with the re-deployment of our Middle East Forces, their assistance might be enlisted. The supply of military equipment in limited quantities to Syria could fairly be considered as part of the price we shall have to pay for the use by our troops of the Gaza Strip. I hope, therefore, that this aspect of the problem can be further considered.

? Ball

(T. E. Evans)

26th April, 1952.

Mr. Wardrop We spoke. The difficulty is, of course, that we cannot just assemble a packet of arms, however attractive, and say that

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(31059) Wt.28233—243 250m 10/50 G.S.St.

that it is what the Syrians want; nor can we very well ask them to submit a list, because of the danger that we might in any event be unable to supply the majority of the items on it. Our failure to do so would make matters even worse.

Meanwhile we can help in various ways:

1) We still have the two jets up our sleeves and will release them provided the Syrians behave over the British Council.

2) We have inserted a passage in a draft paper for the COS about the Gaza strip drawing attention to the desirability of sweetening the Syrians with arms.

3) We can and will increase our pressure on other Depts. to give favourable treatment to Syrian requests. Syria's parish assistance over refugees and (by extension) over the Gaza strip is a new and powerful argument to

30/4. JM 2/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/26

1952

FROM

Sir H. Knight, Beirut
To Sir J. Bowker.

No. AC. 100

Dated 22. 4. 52.

Received in Registry— 6. 5. 52.

U.N. policy regarding resettlement.

Comments on Mr Furlonge's / Sir T. Raffl's memo on future U.N. Policy regarding resettlement.

References

EE 1826/16
15
20

MINUTES

Sir H. Knight's agrees with the conclusion reached in Sir J. Bowker's letter. There are no new points, I think.

Eastern Dept.

18/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
8.5.52.	

39984

(AC 100)

CONFIDENTIAL

EE 1826/26

C/O British Legation,

BEIRUT.

22nd April, 1952.

My dear Bowker,

I have now received a copy of your letter EE 1826/16 of the 19th April to Furlonge, referring to Furlonge's letter of the 21st March and Rapp's letter of the 5th April, regarding policy for Arab refugees.

2. I agree with your letter, but as I was asked in M.E.S. EE 1826/16 of the 12th April to give my observations on Furlonge's and Rapp's letters, I am now sending these.

3. I wrote to Evans on the 15th April explaining that I only got these letters just before the bag went and so sent a copy of a rough note I had made last month on the matter and I will not recapitulate what I said in that note.

4. Since then, UNRWA has had the offer of Colonel Selo for the settlement in Syria of 500,000-600,000 refugees, including refugees now in Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza. Whether this offer is genuine, and, if so, is practicable, one cannot yet say. If it is, it will alter the whole aspect of the refugee problem. Meanwhile, I will comment on the problem on the assumption that Selo's offer is neither genuine nor practicable.

5. On this assumption one might predicate that:

(a) The repatriation of refugees will never take place.

(b) Compensation is most unlikely ever to be paid.

(c) The Arab Governments have no intention of trying to settle the refugees.

(d) They will continue to assert that the refugees are the sole responsibility of the United Nations (i.e., U.S.A. and U.K.).

(e) So long as the U.N. feed the refugees, their Governments will make no attempts to resettle them.

(f) The refugees believe they have a right to receive rations from the U.N. So long as these continue the majority will be content to sit idle, becoming less and less use to themselves or to anybody else.

(g) Neither the Arab Governments nor the refugees contemplate it being within the bounds of possibility that the U.N. might some time cease to feed the refugees.

/(h)

Sir James Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

(h) Even if they be told that supplies are to be stopped, neither party will believe it.

(i) Resettlement of the refugees by UNRWA has so far not succeeded, and responsibility must be placed on the Arab States.

(j) The truest kindness to the refugees themselves would be to compel them by starvation to make an effort towards self-support, even if it should involve much suffering.

6. The objective is to bring the Arab States and the refugees to a state of mind when both will be anxious for resettlement, and the former anxious to provide opportunity for resettlement of the latter. It is possible that a threat by the Advisory Commission Powers not to provide relief after a certain date might produce a desire for resettlement in the former, and a threat of starvation being effective with the latter.

7. There are, as mentioned in your letter, certain objections, for instance, first Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan cannot provide opportunity for resettlement and a threat to Syria, whose refugees are largely integrated into its economy, would be futile. Secondly, it is unlikely that U.S.A., U.K. and France would, when the time came, have the Russian determination to starve half a million people, and the refugees know this, and a threat which it is not possible to carry out is dangerous.

8. UNRWA works under the General Assembly Resolution of the 26th January, 1952, and the refusal by U.S.A., U.K. and France to contribute unless the Arab States took over relief administration, would not necessarily result in transferring relief to the Arab Governments unless the General Assembly agree. With the voting strength of the Arab States and their friends, the Secretary-General and UNRWA might find themselves trying to provide relief from quite inadequate funds, and the U.S.A., U.K. and France would have to watch the starvation of the refugees. Perhaps, therefore, any decision on these lines should be preceded by negotiations to ensure that the proposal would be acceptable to the majority of the General Assembly.

The Advisory Commission Governments last year were anxious for no great change in the original Resolution appointing UNRWA lest Russia should manage to get its hand into the refugee dish. Whether this view still exists I do not know, but it would be difficult for U.S.A., U.K. and France to remain on the Advisory Commission if no longer contributing to relief.

9. The problem posed by Furlonge and Rapp has never been absent from the minds of the Advisory Commission for the last two years, but without any enforceable sanction other than starving the refugees, no solution has yet appeared. Future action regarding the problem must be discussed between U.S.A., U.K., France and Turkey, but these discussions should clearly recognise the possible consequences of any decision, and that such a decision might have to be implemented despite any pressure of political and humanitarian considerations.

10. Among these considerations I need not recapitulate all these mentioned in my note of the 21st-22nd March. To my mind the most difficult problem is, as you say, the result in Jordan if Syria should refuse to accept refugees from Jordan.

/Presumably

Presumably other Powers would soon lose interest in feeding the Jordan refugees and as you say HMG would have them indefinitely on its hands, for, by no stretch of the imagination, can I think that Jordan can ever support the number of refugees there now, however much economic development may take place; and personally I have doubts whether merely feeding the refugees will keep them quiet indefinitely. The easy solution might be the union of Syria and Jordan. I do not know, however, the political and defence complications of any such union.

11. Briefly, I have as yet no solution that can be regarded as certain. The proposals in Furlonge's and Rapp's letters would be welcome subject to the conditions

(a) that the United Nations, and particularly the four Advisory Commission Powers, would be willing to accept such solution and adhere to it even at the cost of suffering to the refugees;

(b) that there exist, or seem to exist, the possibility of the refugees finding the opportunity to support themselves. This opportunity cannot exist in Lebanon or Egypt, and exists only to a minor degree in Jordan. It can only become available in Syria if considerable outside capital be used for economic development.

12. If the first condition be accepted, one might perhaps take a chance on Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt being able to persuade Syria to accept the refugees and the necessary foreign help for economic development. But if they failed to do so, we should be little further on.

13. I do not think it is correct to suggest that the United States, U.K., France and Turkey have been misled by the optimism of the Director and the Advisory Commission's report to the United Nations in Paris. This report was approved before signature by the Governments of the U.S.A., U.K. and France, and I presume of Turkey, and I imagine that my colleagues were as frank as myself in explaining to their Governments the real position of the refugee problem, and that the proposals in the report were, on the one hand, an attempt to buy time to find out if the Arab Governments were really going to co-operate and, on the other, to provide material to get resettlement funds from the American Congress. Also, the Resolution of the United Nations had to be further watered down to prevent trouble over the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

14. As regards the proposal of a special investigating body suggested in paragraph 5 of Rapp's letter, I should have thought this was the proper task of the Advisory Commission to UNRWA and that the four Governments could trust their representatives on the Advisory Commission to give an honest appreciation of the problem. I cannot speak for Locke who has had little chance of seeing UNRWA's work, but the other three of us certainly have no illusions as to the present position. Meanwhile, we are concerned to help the Director to make as good an attempt as possible to carry out the unanimous resolution of the United Nations.

/15.

15. I agree, of course, that the whole refugee problem might well be discussed between the Advisory Commission Governments before the next General Assembly of the United Nations and, if necessary, they might call for a report from their representatives on the Advisory Commission and in the light of that report and the discussion, the Advisory Commission would frame its recommendations for its report to the United Nations General Assembly.

16. The above neglects the possibility of development in Syria. If that succeeds the problem will be largely different, but meanwhile discussion of what to do next in case the offer turns out to be frivolous, need not be neglected.

Yours sincerely,

H.F. Knight

(H.F. KNIGHT)

1952

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PALESTINE

EE 1826/27

FROM

F.O. Hunte
(Mr Evans)

No.

Dated 1.5.52.

Received in Registry— 9.5.52.

Resettlement of Palestine Refugees.

Gives detailed history of the refugees & an account of their present position regarding resettlement.

REFERENCES

EE 1826/26

(MINUTES)

This brief was prepared for Sir W. Strang for use with the Public accounts Committee.

JG 12/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
14/5.	320

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E/1826/27

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

The Palestine refugees constitute not only a great humanitarian problem, but also a grave political problem, the solution of which is essential to the stability of the Middle East. A breakdown in relief arrangements in ~~Palestine~~ Jordan, where refugees number one-third of the population, would undoubtedly result in serious disturbances and probably the collapse of the present régime. The effect of a breakdown in Lebanon might also be serious. Failure to make early progress with the resettlement of the refugees might similarly have serious consequences. Approximately 850,000 refugees at present receive relief (the number of recipients was at one time over one-million). About one-third of the refugees live in camps. They are distributed as follows :-

450,000	Jordan
200,000	Gaza
120,000	Lebanon
80,000	Syria
4,000	Iraq.

2. Prior to the 1st May, 1950, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.) assumed its responsibilities, international assistance had been administered by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (U.N.R.P.R.). Assistance took the form of direct relief, which, however necessary as an emergency measure, offered no hope of a final solution. The General Assembly, therefore, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission (Clapp Mission), set up U.N.R.W.A. with the task not only of continuing direct relief but also of carrying out a programme of relief works which would add to the productive capacity of the countries concerned and lead to the absorption of the refugees. Owing to the

/limited nature .....

limited nature of the programme ($54.m. to cover both relief and works) and inadequate contributions (only about $37.m. was provided) little progress was made. Nevertheless, relief works served as a lead-in to resettlement projects and enabled U.N.R.W.A. to gain the confidence of the Middle East Governments.

3. Although not directly concerned with the political aspects of the Palestine problem, U.N.R.W.A. has been seriously handicapped by the absence of a political settlement between Israel and the Arab States, and in particular by (i) the unwillingness of the Israel Government to accept the United Nations decision that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so; (ii) the unwillingness, until recently, of the Arab States (with the exception of Jordan, where, however, the possibilities are extremely limited) to agree to the resettlement of refugees in Arab countries.

4. These difficulties are being gradually overcome. In November, 1950, the General Assembly extended the scope of U.N.R.W.A.'s work to cover projects for the resettlement of refugees in Arab countries and in Israel. The relevant resolution, which was without prejudice to the right of the refugees to repatriation and compensation, was approved by the Delegates of all Arab countries and of Israel. Subsequently the Arab League and the Arab States individually indicated their willingness to co-operate with U.N.R.W.A. in implementing the $50.m. programme approved by the Assembly, subject to the provision of adequate funds for the realization of its objectives. The Director of U.N.R.W.A. accordingly embarked upon negotiations with the Arab Governments on the basis of a tentative three-year programme of resettlement and diminishing relief. Hitherto

/programmes had ...

programmes had been more or less on a yearly basis. The broad objective of the new programme was to help the refugees to obtain adequate housing and employment. They would be transferred from camps and temporary shelter to suburban housing projects and rural villages. Agricultural lands would be developed through the drilling of wells, irrigation works, access roads, and similar small-scale works. Where necessary vocational training would be provided and also loans to enable refugees to re-establish themselves. The cost of such a programme, apart from the cost of direct relief on a diminishing scale which would amount to about $50.m., would be about $200.m. over three years, including the current year. It was assumed that the programme would be paralleled by a large-scale programme of general economic development, financed by the local Governments, assisted by loans from the International Bank and other sources. Her Majesty's Government have furnished loans to Jordan for this purpose. American Point IV funds are also available, and an International Bank representative is at present in Syria to negotiate a loan with the Syrian Government. The three-year programme was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in January, 1952.

5. Possibilities of resettlement undoubtedly exist in Arab countries, particularly in Syria (and also in Iraq, though climatic and social conditions are not so favourable there and opportunities depend on large-scale long-term economic development). All these countries are in need of development and the economic potential of some of them is considerable. With some notable exceptions (Egypt and Lebanon) they are under populated. Israel, on the other hand, according to an Israel spokesman, is no longer capable of absorbing any appreciable number of these refugees. Her Majesty's Government have consistently maintained

/that it is in .....

that it is in the interests of the refugees themselves that the bulk of them should, without prejudice to their right to return to their homes and to receive compensation for their properties, settle among their Arab brethren in Arab countries rather than in Israel or (as is sometimes suggested) in parts of the world far from their original homes.

6. Negotiations for the implementation of the three-year programme are now proceeding between U.N.R.W.A. and the Arab Governments and the prospects of success are more encouraging than at any time since the problem came into existence. Moreover, offers of contributions for the first year of the three-year programme (July 1951 - June 1952), the cost of which is estimated at $77.m., now amount to $67.m. This includes the United States offer of up to $50.m. and Her Majesty's Government's offer of the equivalent of $12.4.m. The United States Government have offered to contribute $65.m. to the second year's programme. Her Majesty's Government's contribution has not yet been decided.

7. In the meantime, the health and general condition of the refugees, in spite of the conditions under which a great number of them live, are better than those of many of the normal inhabitants of the area. 8. The Director of U.N.R.W.A., who is an American (Mr Blandford) is assisted by an Advisory Commission on which the United Kingdom, United States, France and Turkey are represented. The United Kingdom representative is Sir Henry Knight.

(T. E. Evans.)
Middle East Secretariat.
1st May, 1952.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/28

FROM Sir Thomas Rapp, Fayid.

No. 320

Dated 10th

Received in Registry— 12th May.

Refugee Resettlement in Syria.

Requests information about latest developments.

Addressed to Damascus (No 21 of 10/5) rptd. Beirut.

REFERENCES

EE1826/18 (last paper)

MINUTES

E Dept PWR. 13/5

African Dept

15/5

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21/5

(Print)

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(Action completed)

8D 24/5.

(Index)

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39984

EE1826/28

FROM BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE (FAYID) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

FILES

Sir. T. Rapp
No. 320
10th May, 1952.

D. 2.29.p.m. 10th May, 1952.
R. 4.27.p.m. 10th May, 1952.

SECRET

Addressed to Damascus telegram No. 21 of 10th May, Repeated for information to Beirut.

I and the Commanders in Chief have at present a special interest in developments in Blandford's discussion with Selo about refugee resettlement in Syria because of its possible repercussions on the refugee situation in Gaza.

2. I would therefore be grateful if you would let me know what stage the matter has now reached and keep me posted of all future developments.

Foreign Office please pass to Damascus, and to Beirut as my telegram No. 54.

[Repeated to Damascus and Beirut].

WWWWW

12 MAY 1952

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE 1826/29.

FROM Sir O. Franks, Washington.

No. 477 saving

Dated 7th

Received in Registry— 12th } May.

UNRWA-Syria talks on resettlement of refugees.

Advises against giving publicity to the talks, as it may have an adverse effect on the negotiations.

REFERENCES

EE 1826/26

(Print)

Dfts:- (How disposed of)

Chy:- Beirut, Paris, Ankara, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, BMEO Fayid, U.K. Del N. York

a) W'ton No 543 all dated 13 May

(Action completed) 26/5.

(Index) 30/5

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News Dept. 22/5 a.a.

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EE1826/29

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C.B.
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EN CLAIR (By Bag)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 477 Saving
of 7th May, 1952

D. 8.30 a.m. 8th May, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram
No. 477 Saving of 7th May, 1952
Repeated for information Saving to:

Beirut (for Knight)	No. 24
UKDEL New York	No. 89
Paris	No. 169
Ankara	No. 28
Damascus	No. 25
Amman	No. 21
Cairo	No. 35
B.M.E.O. Fayid	No. 83
Bagdad	No. 24

EE1826/26

Knight's letter AC.100 of April 22nd to Bowker.

UNRWA - SYRIA TALKS ON RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES.

State Department are anxious that these talks should take place in the most favourable atmosphere and that nothing should occur which might wither this delicate plant. In particular they fear effects of publicity in press (such as article by Steele with Damascus dateline which appeared in New York Herald Tribune on May 1st) and have accordingly despatched Circular telegram instructing posts to discourage press speculation and to play talks down generally. They suggest you may wish to do likewise.

FRANKS.

Emf Bag 4pm

+1 composite for WTON

Registry No. EE 1826/29

OUTFILE

Dear Clancery / Delegation

1

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential
Restricted
Open.

Draft.

to
Clancery
Beirut ✓
Paris * ✓
Ankara * ✓
Damascus ✓
Amman ✓
Cairo * ✓
BMEO Fayid * ✓
Bagdad * ✓

UK Del New York

Copy to Washington.

* with Beirut tel. 218.

outfile

UNRWA - Syria talks on resettlement of refugees

(Beirut tel. No. 218 of April 18th.)

2. We should be glad if you would take action as suggested in Washington tel. No. 477 Saving of May 7th.

Yours ever,

M.E. Secretariat.

3. We are sending a similar letter to the recipients of this telegram, & a copy to Washington.

4. Beirut please pass to Sir Henry Knight & to the BMEO.

CW 13/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(42023) WT.41304/225 150,000 2/51 A.&E.W.LTD. GP.685

1825/8

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
13 MAY 1952
SENT TO TYPE 13/5
DESPATCHED 13/5.

(EE 1826/29)

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

13th May, 1952.

Dear Delegation,

United Nations Relief and Works Agency - Syria talks on resettlement of refugees

(Beirut telegram No. 218 of 18th April).

2. We should be glad if you would take action as suggested in Washington telegram No. 477 Saving of 7th May.

3. We are sending a similar letter to the recipients of this telegram, and a copy to Washington.

Yours ever,

MIDDLE EAST SECRETARIAT.

United Kingdom Delegation,

New York.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/30

FROM Sir Henry Knight, Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC100/5

Dated 9th

Received in Registry— 15th } May.

Resettlement in Iraq.

Encloses copy of a letter to Mr. Blandford, discussing the need for skilled labour.

References

EE 1826/21

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

8/21/5.

(Index)

to 30/5

MINUTES

I agree with Sir H Knight

[illegible] 20/5

39984

COPY

19th March, 1952.

(AC 100/5)

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Blandford,

When I was in Bagdad last week I came to the conclusion that though there is at present little chance of direct reintegration of Palestine refugees in that country, yet development works being, and to be, undertaken there will require more skilled labour than is available in the country. Further, I think that if contractors require skilled labour and are informed by the Iraqi Government Labour Board that such and such artisans and tradesmen are not available among their registered Iraq labour, then the Iraqi Government would probably raise no objection to contractors obtaining skilled labour where they could.

2. Knuth has been in touch with some of the contractors, and I suggest that UNRWA consider what kinds of artisans and tradesmen are likely to be needed for development works in Iraq, and immediately check its list of refugees for employment, so that if a firm apply to us to provide so many, say, fitters or joiners, UNRWA placement service can hand them out immediately on a plate.

3. If we are to take advantage of any opportunities which may so offer, we must, I think, be so organised as to offer suitable refugees immediately on demand.

4. Perhaps you would let me know what may be possible in this way.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) H. F. KNIGHT.

The Honourable
John B. Blandford Jr.,
U.N.R.W.A.,
Beirut.

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1826/31

1952

FROM Mr. Chadwick, Tel Aviv, to Mr. Evans.

No. 14201/18/52

Dated 10th May.

Received in Registry— 15th May.

Resettlement in Jordan.

Discusses the development of the Jordan Valley.

Copied to Mr. Walker, Amman.

REFERENCES

EE 1826/22 + 23.

(MINUTES)

Eastern Department. 26.V

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
28/5	

37799

EE 1826/31

BRITISH LEGATION
TEL AVIV

(14201/18/52)
CONFIDENTIAL

10th May, 1952

Dear Trefor,

EE 1826/22

We here have not sent out any comment on Beirut telegram No. 231 of the 25th April about the development of the Jordan Valley, as the Minister had the opportunity of discussing it with Sir Henry Knight on the 29th April. Sir Francis Evans disparaged the State Department's proposals on the ground, mentioned in your reply to Beirut in telegram No. 338 of the 1st May, that the appointment of an outside technical committee by UNWRA would be unacceptable to Israel. We were interested to see Furlonge's telegram No. 159 saying that he too is unhappy about the State Department's proposals.

2. There is just one point in Furlonge's telegram on which I feel obliged to prophesy gloom. He writes in paragraph 3 of the Jordan Government's idea of raising the question of the control of the Jordan under Article 8 (I assume that it is Article 8 and not Article 9) of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement. We have not so far heard from any Israel source that this has yet been done, though we have not made specific enquiries; but we rather fear that the proposal may run up against the usual obstacle that the Israelis will declare their willingness to discuss the matter under Article VIII but only when the matters specified in Article VIII, notably Mount Scopus, have been disposed of first. We cannot at the moment see any reasonable argument by which the Israelis could be induced to modify this attitude, to which they attach the greatest importance.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Walker at Amman.

Yours ever

John Chadwick

(J.E. Chadwick)

T.E. Evans Esq.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE1826/32

FROM Mr. Montagu-Pollock, Damascus.

No. 127

Dated 15th

Received in Registry— 16th } May.

Resettlement of refugees.

Brigadier Silo has declined to conclude an agreement for settlement of refugees until a similar agreement has been arranged for the benefit of the Syrians.

REFERENCES

EE18216/5

~~EE1826/28~~.

MINUTES

? Copy to Treasury (Col Russell Edmunds) with copy of letter under reference (EE18216/5)

M. Ross

[signature] 16/6

[signature] 19/5

E. Div

Copy as above

[signature] 21/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Col Russell Edmunds Tsy ~~May~~ 4 June.

(Action completed) [signature] 6/6

(Index) [signature] 14/6

39984

EE1826/32

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Montagu-Pollock
No. 127
15th May, 1952.

D. 5.10 p.m. 15th May, 1952.
R. 7.26 p.m. 15th May, 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Memin Fayid telegram No. 14 of 15th May.
Repeated for information to Beirut,
Amman,
Foreign Office.

Your telegram No. 21.

320 to FO
EE1826/28

Situation remains as indicated in second paragraph of Sir H. Knight's letter to Mr. T. Evans of 6th May.

2. At four hours' meeting yesterday between Blandford and Silo, the latter declined to conclude any agreement for settlement of refugees until parallel agreement had been worked out in principle for financing development projects for the benefit of Syrian people.

3. I will explain the position in detail to Sir T. Rapp on 18th May, but I do not anticipate any quick development.

Foreign Office please pass Memin Fayid as my telegram 14.

[Repeated to Memin Fayid.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:
Eastern Department.
Middle East Secretariat.
United Nations Economic and
Social Department.

XXX

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1826/33

FROM Fayid,
B.M.E.O., G.H.Q., M.E.L.F. 17

No. 107/3/2
Dated 12th
Received in Registry— 20th } May.

Resettlement.

Encloses copy of a letter to Beirut about the meeting of Arab political groups to be held in Damascus in August.

Copied Beirut, Damascus & Cairo

REFERENCES

(MINUTES)

Eastern Dept (7, Prince Gordon)

[illegible] 27.v

[illegible] 22/5

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

[illegible] 29/5

(Index)

[illegible] 6/6

38068

British Middle East Office,
Political Division,
G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.17.

UNCLASSIFIED

12th May, 1952.

Dear Chancery,

We have seen a reference in the Cairo Egyptian Mail of May 10th to a proposed meeting of "representatives of all political groups in the Arab world" in Damascus on August 15th. One of the items on the agenda is apparently to discuss the plan for a resettlement of the Arab refugees put forward by U.N.R.W.A.. According to the report, Toufiq Said Toukan, described as the Chairman of the Arab Refugee Executive Committee, has said that the meeting has been approved by the foreign ministries of Syria and the Lebanon.

2. We should be grateful to know if you have any information about this meeting. This is the first reference we have seen to it.

3. Incidentally, the main purpose of the paragraph in the Egyptian Mail is to report that the Refugee Executive Committee have sent a cable to the United Nations asking for Mr. Blandford's dismissal and for the abandonment of his resettlement plan.

4. We are sending similar letters to the Chanceries at Beirut and Damascus and copies to Eastern Department and Chancery, Cairo.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Chancery,
British Legation,
Beirut.

IF.

Resettlement of Arab refugees; programme of resettlement in Syria and Jordan. Code EE file 1826 (papers 1 to 33). 1952. MS Refugee Records from the General Correspondence Files of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office, Record Group 371, 1947-1970 FO 371/98511. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom).